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ON SOCIAL CREDIT AND THE RIGHT TO 
BE UNNETWORKED 
Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz 
Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you 
are. This ancient social philosophy is at the heart of a new 
financial technology system—social credit. In recent years, 
loosely regulated marketplace lenders have increasingly 
developed methods to rank individuals, including those 
traditionally considered unscored or credit-less. Specifically, 
some lenders build their score-generating algorithms around 
behavioral data gleaned from social media and social 
networking information, including the quantity and quality 
of social media presence, the identity and features of the 
applicant’s contacts, the applicant’s online social ties and 
interactions, the applicant’s contacts’ financial standing, the 
applicant’s personality attributes as extracted from her online 
footprints, and more. 
This Article studies the potential consequences of social 
credit systems predicated on a simple transaction: authorized 
use of highly personal information in return for better interest 
rates. Following a detailed description of emerging social 
credit systems, the Article analyzes the inclination of rational 
and irrational customers to be socially active online and/or 
disclose all their online social-related information for 
financial ranking purposes. This examination includes, inter 
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alia, consumers’ preferences as well as mistakes, 
gamesmanship, and consumers’ self-doxing or lack thereof. 
The Article then moves to discuss policy challenges triggered 
by social-based financial ranking that may become the new 
creditworthiness baseline criteria. It focuses on (i) direct 
privacy harms to loan seekers, and derivative privacy harm to 
loan seekers’ online contacts or followers, (ii) online social 
segregation potentially mirrored by offline social polarization, 
and (iii) due process violations derived from algorithmic 
decision-making and unsupervised machine learning. The 
Article concludes by making a significant normative 
contribution, introducing a limited “right to be unnetworked,” 
to accommodate the welcomed aspects of social credit systems 
while mitigating many of their undesired consequences. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When people discovered gold on the remote Klondike 
River in Canada in 1897, they recognized its potential, 
became excited, and rushed to find more. The years following 
the 2008 financial crisis witnessed a similar rush for a new 
kind of gold: online marketplace lending. The term “best 
describes the many fast-growing firms using [financial] 
technology [“FinTech”] to build online platforms that stand 
between borrowers and lenders.”1 Marketplace lenders 
reinterpreted the traditional notion that past conduct serves 
as a useful indicator for predicting an individual’s future. 
Historically, lenders used secretive scoring models to 
formulate a person’s credit score based on the individual’s 
past financial behavior and additional factors bearing 
predictive value.2 The opacity surrounding financial 
rankings did not tally with their significance on individuals’ 
 
1 Kevin Wack, Colin Wilhelm & John Adams, Innovation of the Year: 




2 See Ian O’Neill, Disparate Impact, Federal/State Tension, and the 
Use of Credit Scores by Insurance Companies, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
151, 152–53 (2007) (explaining that credit scores are created by “applying 
complex formulas, also known as statistical models, to specific information 
contained within the consumer’s credit report”). 
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lives and their likelihood for errors.3 Statutory attempts to 
increase transparency and improve the scoring regime 
ensued, the most cited of which are the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”),4 the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (“FACTA”),5 and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).6 
Despite legislative initiatives, challenges remain—nearly 
twenty percent of the American population is financially 
underserved and disconnected from the mainstream 
financial system in some way.7 Broad financial inclusion 
enables economic growth by lessening poverty while 
increasing wealth, and, more importantly, driving 
profitability. By providing financial services to the 
underserved, marketplace lenders have been tapping into an 
underutilized market and successfully extracting impressive 
revenues.8 Specifically, new entrants have challenged the 
 
3 See Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated 
Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 248 (2011) (“[W]hile a 
‘credit score is derived after an information-gathering process that is 
anything but rigorous,’ it ‘has become the only thing that matters anymore 
to the banks and other institutions that underwrite mortgages.’”) (quoting 
Joe Nocera, Credit Score is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/business/24nocera.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/M5G5-Y5S7])). 
4 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
5 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108–159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended across sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970). 
6 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012). 
7 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CFPB DATA 
POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 12–14 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZED2-6Q76] 
(explaining that 19.4 million Americans have credit records that cannot be 
scored and approximately 26 million other Americans do not have credit 
records). For a discussion about the banking abilities, or lack thereof, of 
the poor, see Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 
123 (2004) (discussing the dual financial services market in which banks 
largely serve middle- and upper-income classes, and check cashers and 
other alternative service providers largely serve low- and moderate-income 
classes). 
8 See Mal Warwick et al., Do Impact Investors Expect Too Much?, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/ 
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existing scoring model by offering loans based on new data-
centric underwriting methods and algorithmic scoring. These 
entrants found that a person’s shopping habits, the way an 
individual clicks through web pages or writes her name, and 
even a purchase of felt pads, correlate with forecasted 
financial behavior.9 
Big data, a better and lower-cost method of risk 
prediction, has increasingly attracted data hungry creditors 
to the financial landscape. Among those creditors, an 
additional scoring model gradually gained traction. This 
model advances the idea that data collected and analyzed 
should measure character, which John Pierpont Morgan 
called the central predictor of creditworthiness a century 
ago.10 Character, in this sense, manifests through an online 
social footprint, especially a person’s virtual social circles.11 
 
entry/do_impact_investors_expect_too_much [http://perma.cc/KR2Z-ZJQF] 
(noting that microfinance is now a $68-billion-dollar industry). 
9 See, e.g., Tracy Alloway, Big data: Credit where credit’s due, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7933792e-a2e6-11e4-
9c06-00144feab7de.html#axzz3g5O59fj9 [http://perma.cc/KR2Z-ZJQF] 
(describing a man who had his credit limit cut by $7000 because he 
shopped at stores frequented by individuals with poor repayment 
histories); The ‘Social’ Credit Score: Separating the Data from the Noise, 
WHARTON (June 5, 2013), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-
social-credit-score-separating-the-data-from-the-noise/ [http://perma.cc/P2 
LS-5BC7] (“ZestFinance founder and former Google CIO Douglas Merrill 
said people who type only in lower-case, or upper-case, letters are more 
likely to be deadbeats, all other things being equal.”). 
10 See J.P. MORGAN’S TESTIMONY: THE JUSTIFICATION OF WALL STREET 
50 (1912), http://memory.loc.gov/service/gdc/scd0001/2006/20060517001te/ 
20060517001te.pdf [http://perma.cc/5238-BU5K] (recording J. P. Morgan’s 
statement about creditworthiness that “[t]he first thing is character”). J. 
P. Morgan’s words are a favorite quote of Jeff Stewart, the co-founder of 
Lenddo Ltd., a successful social credit startup. Evelyn M. Rusli, Bad 
Credit? Start Tweeting, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424127887324883604578396852612756398 [http://perma. 
cc/2CJY-8THU] (describing Jeff Stewart’s affinity for J. P. Morgan’s 
quote). 
11 See Sangwon Yoon, Lot of Contacts in Your Mobile Phone May Get 
You Loans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-11-15/lot-of-contacts-in-your-mobile-phone-you-may-qualify-
for-a-loan [http://perma.cc/ZMW9-2Z3B] (“[O]ne’s friends are predictors for 
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Proponents of social credit claim that one’s friends are a 
constructive indicator of financial trustworthiness, as people 
are more likely to be better borrowers if their friends are.12 
Creditworthiness predictors use information about the size 
and strength of a person’s social network, exchanged 
messages, tagged photos, browsing habits, education, 
searches, and geo-spatial data from mobile phones.13 Smaller 
companies like Lenddo and Kreditech first unlocked the 
value of social financial ranking, but mainstream 
institutions have started eying it as well. Recently, Facebook 
indicated clear interest in the social credit market by 
registering a patent on financial ranking technology based 
on a user’s social connections.14 An executive from FICO, the 
most dominant U.S. provider of underwriting frameworks, 
recently acknowledged the predictive value of information 
 
creditworthiness just as they are for propensity to smoke, be obese or 
promiscuous.”). 
12 See id. (“[P]eople are more likely to be better borrowers if they have 
friends who pay back their loans on time.”) 
13 See Tom Groenfeldt, Lenddo Creates Credit Scores Using Social 
Media, DIGITALIST MAG. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.digitalistmag.com/finan 
cial-management/lenddo-creates-credit-scores-using-social-media-0215 
5945 [http://perma.cc/4TZH-YMZ5] (describing Lenddo’s efforts to use 
social data to help banks evaluate lending candidates). 
14 U.S. Patent No. 9,100,400 (filed Aug. 4, 2015).  Facebook’s interest 
in this market and such a patent resulted in much discussion about the 
potential abilities of Facebook in the future. See, e.g., Kevin Maney, 
Facebook Could Blow Up Credit Cards and Make Loans to Billions, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2016), http://europe.newsweek.com/facebook-
payments-loans-credit-messenger-paypal-445675?rm=eu [https://perma.cc/ 
A7JP-BUTV] (noting that “[i]f Facebook provides you with the ability to 
pay, starts collecting your transaction data and adds that to your social 
data that already says a lot about your character—well, then Facebook 
will have the kind of information it needs to become a stand-alone credit 
card company.” The article further explains that this would allow 
Facebook to “jettison Visa, MasterCard and FICO scores and directly offer 
you credit based on everything its machines can learn about you—while 
charging much lower interest rates and cheaper fees than current cards. It 
would be free from all the costly infrastructure and middlemen now 
involved in credit cards.”) 
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volunteered on social media platforms.15 In addition, credit-
reporting agency Experian will soon begin implementing a 
business loan program that uses data from social networks 
and media sources.16 
The social credit model uses troves of personal consumer 
information, conveniently volunteered by the ultimate 
source—the consumer herself. Recent studies show that 
offering financial incentives drives many to disclose 
information about themselves and their social world with 
little consideration given to possible consequences of 
sharing.17 Social credit systems are thus likely to 
demonstrate continuous growth and move from fringe to 
mainstream lending institutions. As a result, consumers’ 
behavior must adapt to the new set of social creditworthiness 
measurement standards.18 
Assuming consumer behavior does adapt, this Article 
proposes rational individuals will react in one of two ways: 
one group, labeled Type A, maximizes its utility by avoiding 
online social associations or consciously refusing to exhibit a 
 
15 Ben McLannahan, Being ‘wasted’ on Facebook may damage your 
credit score, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6dae 
dee-706a-11e5-9b9e-690fdae72044.html [http://perma.cc/Q34Z-9ZDQ] (“If 
you look at how many times a person says ‘wasted’ in their profile, it has 
some value in predicting whether they’re going to repay their debt.” 
(quoting FICO CEO Will Lansing)). 
16 See Kery Murakami, Use of Facebook ‘Likes’ in Lending Decisions 
Raises Concerns, BANKING DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 3, 2015) (describing 
Experian’s new business loan program that “may factor in data from Yelp, 
Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare to compare a business with others of 
the same type”). 
17 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal 
Prospectus and the Threat of a Full Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1153, 1157–58 (2011) (“[I]f some individuals stand to benefit by revealing a 
favorable value of some trait, others will be forced to disclose their less 
favorable values.” (quoting ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 
104 (1988)). 
18 Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of 
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 127, 179 (2009) (“Individuals adapt to the behavior of other 
players in the market. Individuals also adapt to the set of legal rules 
designed to constrain their behavior.”). 
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better online social persona. They prioritize privacy or other 
interests above the benefits obtained from social networks, 
including the prospect of a better financial deal. Type A 
individuals are likely to be wealthy individuals, who can 
afford to pay more to maintain their privacy or other values.  
The second group of rational consumers, referred to as 
Type B, acts to improve its online social image by deleting 
contacts that could potentially damage its credit score. Later, 
Type B individuals also limit new online social interactions 
only to links not perceived as financially problematic. 
Evidence from different markets, in which online social 
impressions factor into the decision-making process, 
suggests rational individuals would attempt to better their 
positions by artificially enhancing their online reputations.19 
Individuals know their exhibited online behavior is 
observable and could spoil their chances of being admitted to 
an academic institution, hired for a job, or compensated by 
an insurance company. These rational actors react by 
limiting access to their online profiles, cleaning up their 
profiles, using different names, and even creating entirely 
new accounts tailored specifically to the image they wish to 
display.20 
 
19 See infra Parts III.B.1 & III.B.2 (noting that individuals often 
attempt to improve their positions and harness various systems to their 
advantage). As the examples discussed infra show, the use of social 
information as evidence of skills, status, or occurrences is a growing and 
significant phenomenon. While it could be the focus of future follow-up 
research, this Article focuses on social credit, and only briefly reviews 
other social ranking trends and the reactions to them. For more about 
“reputational systems” and the risk they pose, see Frank Pasquale, 
Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely 
Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET, PRIVACY, 
SPEECH, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 
2010). See infra text accompanying notes 152–68 (describing the use of 
social information by academic institutions, human resource departments, 
and insurance companies to evaluate individuals). 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 154–55 (discussing a recent 
study that found many students delete or edit their social media accounts 
to improve their admission prospects). 
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However, cognitive bias affects some people and they 
depart from rational choice behavior.21 By acting irrationally, 
those individuals fail to maximize their utility and are 
subject to greater transaction costs.22 Cognitive bias gives 
rise to two additional types of groups; the first, Type C 
individuals, are the irrational reflection of Type A 
individuals. They, too, are social network avoiders or social 
networkers that would not attempt to improve their online 
social reflection. But unlike Type A individuals, whose choice 
is rationally calculated, Type C individuals are irrationally 
lazy, passive, or otherwise lacking understanding of 
technological advancement. They would not break away from 
harmful contacts and would refrain from guiding their online 
socialization to improve their credit scores.  
Composed of social network avoiders, Type D individuals 
exemplify an additional set of irrational behaviors. Type D 
individuals avoid the network to conceal information that 
could be negatively impacting their scores. Type D 
individuals may have used social networks in the past, but 
responded to the rise of social credit by abstaining from 
social networks altogether. By dint of avoidance, Type D 
attempt to hide their low creditworthiness in the hope that 
they will be assigned a better score since less information is 
available. Nevertheless, because creditworthy individuals 
signal that they are indeed creditworthy, the attempt to hide 
information could mark Type D individuals as even worse 
than they really are; they would be viewed as lemons. 
The rise of social credit systems poses a number of policy 
challenges. First, the use of an individual’s social 
information may inflict privacy harms at two levels—direct, 
to the loan seeker, and derivative, to the loan seeker’s 
contacts. At the direct level, the loan seeker waives her right 
to privacy as a part of the transaction: the user provides and 
 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 169–70 (describing the cognitive 
biases, such as contextualization effects and self-control errors that cause 
irrational behavior on social networks). 
22 See infra Part III.B.3 (explaining the consequences of being too 
passive to improve one’s online profile or being altogether absent from 
social networking). 
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authorizes the use of information about her in return for 
attractive interest rates. At the derivative level, however, a 
troubling privacy risk transpires. Social credit systems 
inherently implicate the information of third parties, who 
never agreed their information could be collected, evaluated, 
or analyzed. Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual 
integrity further spotlights the privacy impairment, as third 
parties have rarely (and probably have not at any point) 
contemplated the possibility of being evaluated for the 
purpose of financially ranking others when first disclosing 
information in the course of online socialization.23 
Second, social scoring systems risk inducing social 
segregation. Systematic consideration of social information 
motivates individuals, such as those in the Type B group, to 
increase their chances of getting the best financial terms. 
Following this logic, we should expect rational individuals to 
eliminate social red flags and showcase contacts who exhibit 
good financial standing. Widespread artificial reorganization 
of online social circles may lead to online social polarization, 
in which users are regrouped by the level of financial risk 
they embody. Online and offline circles do not operate as 
separate domains for social action.24 Instead, social networks 
 
23 See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2010) 
(describing the importance of social contexts and context-relative 
informational norms when considering the right to privacy). For another 
interesting theory that can also be relevant in this context, see Joshua 
A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 
385 (2015) (explaining that even though privacy is commonly studied as a 
private good, this notion misses a key aspect of the policy problem, as “an 
individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive 
information about herself, but about others as well.” The article further 
explains that the “negative externalities imposed on nonconsenting 
outsiders by such carelessness can be productively studied in terms of 
welfare economics. If all relevant individuals maximize private benefit, 
and expect all other relevant individuals to do the same, neoclassical 
economic theory predicts that society will achieve a suboptimal level of 
privacy.”) 
24 See Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of Facebook ‘‘Friends:’’ 
Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 
12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1144 (2007) (observing that 
“online connections resulted in face-to-face meetings”). 
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merge online and offline behaviors and support the 
conclusion that an online practice of filtering one’s friends 
list based on financial health would bear real life 
consequences. The potential score-based segregation could 
curtail the resources accumulated through relationships 
among people, broadly conceptualized as social capital.25 As 
social capital correlates with social mobility, social credit 
systems may further paralyze socioeconomic mobility.26 
Furthermore, social credit could force individuals to face a 
painful choice between their social ties from the past or a 
better financial score in the future. 
Social credit systems combine traditional credit scoring 
with algorithmic decision-making based on large datasets. 
People criticize traditional scoring methods for their opacity, 
arbitrary results, and disparate impact on minorities.27 
Computer algorithmic scoring models that use big data 
mining further exacerbate these problems. The data mined 
might be inaccurate or inappropriate, algorithmic modeling 
may be biased or limited, machine-learning capabilities can 
make inferences as to undisclosed information and factor in 
forbidden or unsuitable variables, and the uses of algorithms 
are often opaque and hard to challenge.28 
 
25 See PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO 
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 14 (1992) (“Social structures and cognitive 
structures are recursively and structurally linked, and the correspondence 
that obtains between them provides one of the most solid props of social 
domination.”). 
26 See PABLO A. MITNIK ET AL., NEW ESTIMATES OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
MOBILITY USING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 70–72 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/15rpintergenmobility.pdf [http://perma.cc/U726-KPXL] (finding 
that a large share of inequality between families at the 10th and 90th 
income percentiles continues into the following generation). 
27 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10–16 (2014) 
(criticizing credit scoring systems for their opaqueness, inconsistent 
results, and poor treatment of women and minorities). 
28 See infra Part V (arguing that “large data sets are prone to errors, 
outages, and losses that are amplified when multiple data sets are 
combined”). 
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Against the backdrop of broad privacy harm, the potential 
of social segregation, and algorithmic eradication of due 
process tenets, we argue that underwriting should generally 
exclude social information. Consequently, we introduce a 
limited “right to be unnetworked,” aimed at preventing 
financial penalties for social choices. Our proposal intends to 
confine the use of social information to a set of the prescribed 
exceptions, and to de facto bestow upon consumers a limited 
right to be unnetworked. 
This proposal attempts to respond to the rise of social 
credit. Similar to the ban on the use of medical information 
for credit scoring purposes, such a limited right to be 
unnetworked weighs non-monetary values in addition to 
financially sound practices. A limited right to be 
unnetworked would balance the use of social credit systems 
with the goal of broadening financial inclusion, while 
eliminating some of the negative byproducts and minimizing 
those that cannot be prevented. 
This Article consists of seven parts. Part II traces the 
evolution of credit scoring models and details the emergence 
of social credit systems. Part III reviews four types of 
consumer responses to social credit. Part IV discusses direct 
and derivative privacy challenges posed by social credit 
systems. Part V continues to describe the risk of social 
segregation, which is a natural consequence of online social 
cleanup. Part VI spotlights due process violations that 
computerized algorithmic decision-making may engender. 
Part VII introduces the limited right to be unnetworked after 
ruling out disclosure-based and disparate impact solutions. A 
brief conclusion follows the seventh part. 
II. FROM A FACELESS CREDIT TO A SOCIAL 
SCORE 
A. History of Traditional Credit Scoring 
A credit score is a numerical expression based on a 
statistical formula to evaluate an individual’s financial 
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health and creditworthiness at a given point in time.29 By 
comparing a potential borrower’s weighted values with an 
actual borrower’s weighted values, credit-scoring systems 
calculate the specific level of risk that a person or entity 
brings to a particular transaction.30 The retail and banking 
industries were the first to assess the financial 
trustworthiness of potential borrowers in the United 
States.31 As time passed, banks delegated lending decisions 
to individual experts, and later to specialized finance 
companies.32 FICO first devised its ranking formula in the 
1950s and has since established itself as an industry 
standard for consumer credit of all kinds.33 Even though 
FICO provides scoring blueprints to the three major credit 
bureaus—Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian—cases of 
conflicting scores are common because each agency applies 
its own individual model.34 Adding to the complexity and 
variation, specific industries use specialized versions of 
 
29 See Hussein A. Abdou & John Pointon, Credit Scoring, Statistical 
Techniques and Evaluation Criteria: A Review of the Literature, 18 
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS ACCT. FIN. & MGMT. 59, 62 (2011) for the different 
definitions of credit scoring. 
30 See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 152 (“[A] consumer credit score is 
calculated to represent the particular level of risk that the individual 
consumer poses in a commercial transaction.”). 
31 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 8–9 (presenting the 
history of credit scoring systems). 
32 See id. (noting that experts were eventually “entrusted to make 
lending decisions” and that specialized finance companies “entered the 
mix” after World War II). 
33 See Nate Cullerton, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J. 807, 
810 (2013); see also Alloway, supra note 9 (“By 1995 Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, the US government’s housing finance agencies, endorsed the 
use of credit scores as part of the mortgage underwriting process, 
embedding them in the fabric of the American financial system. By 2000, 
FICO scores were used in more than 75 per cent of home mortgage 
originations. In 2015, [FICO] says its scores are used in more than 90 per 
cent of lending decisions.”). 
34 See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused 
the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (2009) (noting that 
the three separate credit agencies can produce varying scores due to their 
distinct models). 
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credit scores.35 Within the credit-card underwriting and 
certain personal-financial applications industries, 
VantageScore, which was jointly developed by the three 
major repositories, has grown to be the prevailing score.36 
Proprietary algorithms labeled as trade secrets protect 
the exact scoring methods for all credit scores.37 Credit-
rating companies justify secrecy as a means to keep 
competitors from learning how their systems are built and 
operated, and to prevent scored individuals from deceiving 
the lender by falsifying their applications to reach a desired 
score.38 Nevertheless, critics claim that the opacity 
surrounding existing scoring methods disallows consumers, 
advocates, and regulators from challenging those models.39 
The lack of an industry-wide standard mathematical model 
for use in insurance credit scoring contributes to this overall 
lack of transparency and leaves consumers in the dark as to 
how their credit score is calculated.40 The use of existing 
credit-scoring systems, however, is generally treated as a fair 
and objective method for evaluating an individual’s 
creditworthiness.41 
Congress enacted FCRA42 in 1970 to address the 
increasing collection of personal information.43 The FCRA 
increased transparency in a previously guarded and 
 
35 See Terry Clemans, Foreword, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 782 
(2013) (explaining that there are “dozens of specialty versions of credit 
scores that are honed for specific industries”). 
36 See id. (describing the creation of VantageScore and its 
competition). But see O’Neill, supra note 2, at 172–73 (arguing that the 
lack of a uniform credit model was “largely eviscerated” by the 
development of VantageScore). 
37 See Adi Osovsky, The Misconception of the Consumer As A Homo 
Economicus: A Behavioral-Economic Approach to Consumer Protection in 
the Credit-Reporting System, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 888 (2013). 
38 Federal Reserve Board Releases Staff Paper On Credit Scoring. 
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) ¶ 97,708, 1979 WL 486735 (Dec. 28, 1979). 
39 Pasquale, supra note 3. 
40 See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 172. 
41 See Pasquale, supra note 3, at 249. 
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a–x (2012). 
43 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 16. 
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mysterious credit reporting industry.44 Under the FCRA, 
credit repositories and all “consumer reporting agencies” 
must assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 
contained in the credit report.45 The FCRA also bestows upon 
consumers the right to access their credit reports,46 dispute 
the completeness or accuracy of their reports, ask for 
corrections, and annotate their records when resolutions 
cannot be achieved.47 In 2003, Congress passed the FACTA,48 
which mandated the provision of complimentary annual 
credit reports to all consumers, added protections in the 
credit reporting industry to combat fraud, and offered 
victims of identity theft a procedure for clearing their credit 
scores of debt.49 In addition to granting consumers rights to 
protect themselves, federal law prohibits discrimination by 
credit agencies as well. The ECOA, enacted in 1974, 
prohibits credit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or the 
receipt of public assistance.50 ECOA mandates that while 
creditors may ask individuals for information about the 
characteristics listed above, creditors are prohibited from 
using that information when deciding whether to give 
 
44 Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History 
Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1744–48 (2012) 
(explaining how the FCRA alleviated the opacity associated with the credit 
reporting process).  
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012) (“Whenever a consumer reporting 
agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the 
individual about whom the report relates.”).  
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (2012). 
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2012) (“Procedure in Case of Disputed 
Accuracy”). 
48 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108–59, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended across sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970). 
49 See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND 
THE LAW (2010). 
50 The ECOA is a United States law (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et 
seq.); see also Your Equal Credit Opportunity Rights, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0347-your-equal-credit-
opportunity-rights [http://perma.cc/EQZ5-SLHD]. 
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individuals credit or when setting the terms of their credit.51 
Moreover, the law provides protections when individuals 
deal with organizations or people who regularly extend 
credit, including banks, small loan and finance companies, 
retail and department stores, credit card companies, and 
credit unions.52 Everyone who participates in the decision to 
grant credit or in setting the terms of that credit must 
comply with the ECOA. 
The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession exposed 
the inadequacy of the then-existing risk management tools 
and lending practices. Subsequently, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-
Frank Act”)53 implemented more legal protections to increase 
the transparency of the credit analysis process. Primarily, 
the Dodd-Frank Act required greater disclosure of the 
qualitative and quantitative content involved in credit 
decision-making.54 Until the enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) had primary 
regulatory responsibility over the credit bureaus.55 The 
Dodd-Frank Act transferred a significant part of the FTC’s 
enforcement authority to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”),56 but the two regulatory agencies still 
share some overlapping enforcement power over FCRA 
consumer regulations.57 Shortly after its initiation, the 
CFPB, which is empowered to oversee “larger participant[s] 
of a market for other consumer financial products or 
 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1872–83 (2010). 
54 Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 749, 771 (2013). 
55 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (2012) (granting limited administrative 
enforcement power to state attorneys general). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s 
(2012). 
56 12 U.S.C. § 5581(5) (2012). For more on the agency, see, e.g., Todd 
J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace? 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 860 (2013). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(3). 
57 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(3) (2012). 
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services,”58 issued a rule to define credit-reporting agencies 
as “larger participants”59 and confirmed that credit-reporting 
agencies are subject to the same supervision process applied 
to banks.60 
B. Future Opportunities for Financial Inclusion 
Notwithstanding the constant improvement that the 
existing credit-scoring regime has undergone in the past few 
decades, it has yet to succeed in providing appropriate tools 
for broader financial inclusion. A 2013 report estimated the 
financially underserved community at nearly 67 million 
credit invisibles who have thin or no credit files.61 This cohort 
includes mostly college students and young adults, 
immigrants, widows or new divorcees, the elderly, ethnic 
minorities, low-income individuals, and individuals who 
mistrust large financial institutions.62 Lacking relevant 
financial records, such as evidence of a loan repayment, to 
meet the requirements of conventional scoring models, these 
consumers do not generate sufficient data to establish credit 
standing. As a result, millions are considered “unscorable,” 
and their economic behavior, which amounts to a significant 
share of the country’s economy, is marginalized.63 Unscored 
individuals are generally ineligible for lending services such 
 
58 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011). 




60 See Carter Dougherty, Consumer Bureau to Supervise Debt 
Collectors, Credit Bureaus, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/consumer-bureau-to-supervise-
debt-collectors [http://perma.cc/Q8Q6-YPG3]. 
61 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2013 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/ 
householdsurvey/2013report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BXK-NFWR]. 
62 See David Bornstein, ‘Invisible’ Credit? (Read This Now!), N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/ 
invisible-credit-read-this-now/ [http://perma.cc/TSJ3-4MQC]. 
63 See id. 
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as auto loans, mortgages, and student loans. In addition, 
they cannot enjoy short-term credit for routine or emergency 
necessities.64 In the absence of mainstream lending products, 
these individuals turn to alternatives like payday loans that 
entail excessive fees, high interest rates, and draconian 
terms.65 
Clearly, policy-makers must strike the right equilibrium 
between responsible underwriting and access to credit.66 
Access to credit is a cornerstone of financial advancement 
and a vital asset-building implement,67 and regulators, 
policymakers, academics, and consumers share the 
understanding that broader financial inclusion is socially 
desirable.68 Catering to the credit-underserved could also be 
an exceptional business opportunity for lenders to provide 
financial services to those outside traditional banking 
systems through microfinance loans.69 The microfinance 
 
64 See id.; see also Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of 
Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 489–90 (2013). 
65 A recent report by the Center for Responsible Lending describes 
how mainstream credit alternatives attract poor consumers into revolving 
debt and a wealth of problems. See James H. Carr, A $1,000 Loan Can 
Balloon into a $40,000 Debt—And It’s Legal, FORBES (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2015/07/14/a-1000-loan-can-
balloon-into-a-40000-debt-and-its-legal/ [http://perma.cc/JR54-R8RE]. 
66 This is not to undermine the importance of striking the right 
equilibrium between responsible underwriting and access to credit. For 
the claim of a causal connection between permissive access to credit and 
the global growth in consumer bankruptcy filings see, e.g., Ronald J. 
Mann, Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 402–04 (2006). Others who lobbied against 
poverty, such as Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, hold the belief that 
access to credit should be broad and even viewed as a human right. See 
MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREDIT FOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT: A FUNDAMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHT (1987). 
67 See Baradaran, supra note 64; see also Bornstein, supra note 62. 
68 See Debra W. Still, New Credit Score Models Hold Promise for 
Credit Access, AM. BANKER (June 2, 2015), http://www.american 
banker.com/bankthink/new-credit-score-models-hold-promise-for-credit-
access-1074633-1.html [http://perma.cc/7X93-52Y8]. 
69 See BEATRIZ ARMENDÁRIZ & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF 
MICROFINANCE 1–24 (2005). 
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industry was built on the shared premise that establishing 
revenue-generating loans methods that met the needs of the 
financially underserved both gave recipients dignity by 
allowing them to be customers rather than supplicants and 
yielded more capital than charity alone could have ever 
returned.70 The appeal of these industries affected credit-
scoring practices. As a result, financial professionals sought 
alternative segmentation and scoring techniques to admit 
additional consumers into the financial mainstream and 
boost revenue.71 Today, microfinance is a thriving global 
business estimated at $68 billion worldwide.72 
1. Marketplace Lending—Big Data Mining 
Advanced data collection and analytics capabilities, 
known as “big data,”73 allow traditional credit score suppliers 
 
70 See Froth at the Bottom of the Pyramid, ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14298996 [https://perma.cc/9TVN-66XX]. 
71 See Annamaria Andriotis, FICO Announces New Credit Score 
Based on Alternative Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/fico-announces-new-credit-score-based-on-alternative-data-142798 
9748 [http://perma.cc/NAX7-KXRD]. 
72 See Warwick et al., supra note 8. The industry’s failure to increase 
the income of the poor and eliminate poverty is often cited as a principal 
counterweight to the economic success of microfinance. See, e.g., Erica 
Field et al., Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage 
Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India, 103 
AM. ECON. REV. 2196 (2013). Some even go as far as blaming microfinance 
for making poverty worse. See, e.g., Jason Hickel, The Microfinance 
Delusion: Who Really Wins?, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www. 
theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/10/ 
the-microfinance-delusion-who-really-wins [http://perma.cc/R37S-EEMD] 
(“Microfinance has become a socially acceptable mechanism for extracting 
wealth and resources from poor people.”) . 
73 There is no unified definition of “big data.” The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines it as “[e]xtremely large data sets that may be analyzed 
computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially 
relating to human behavior and interactions.” Big Data, OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_ 
english/big-data [http://perma.cc/CPX3-AVNZ]. For more on the definition 
of big data and the controversy surrounding it, see Jenna Dutcher, What Is 
Big Data?, DATASCIENCE@BERKELEY (Sept. 3, 2015), http://datascience. 
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to increase the accuracy of their scoring methods, and 
embrace non-traditional credit criteria to augment financial 
inclusion. FICO, for example, recently announced that in 
addition to its legacy scoring methodologies it will now 
incorporate alternative data in its credit calculations.74 Such 
data includes property and public records, as well as 
telecommunications and utility bills.75 Furthermore, lenders 
have been reportedly expanding their evaluation methods 
beyond credit scoring to “credit analytics,” by tracking all 
recorded transactions and scrutinizing terms of a given 
credit accordingly.76 One credit card issuer found a peculiar 
yet compelling correlation between purchases of felt pads for 
furniture and excellent credit risk.77 Most credit card 
companies have also set up systems to detect unsettling 
patterns that are indicative of higher risk. For example, 
charges for marriage counseling may lead to a lower credit 
line, higher interest rates, or a tighter repayment schedule 
because other evidence points to a strong connection between 
marriage problems and high credit risk.78 
The great promise of big data as a way to screen loan 
candidates has attracted additional players into the lending 
industry. Finance start-ups have attempted to capitalize on 
the ability to harness information in novel ways to create 
 
berkeley.edu/what-is-big-data/ [http://perma.cc/CFF8-YGAD]; Gil Press, 12 
Big Data Definitions: What’s Yours?, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitions-
whats-yours/2/ [http://perma.cc/MWH2-8YMY]. 
74 See Andriotis, supra note 71. 
75 See id. (noting that as a result of these alternative scoring 
mechanisms, “of the approximately 53 million Americans who don't have 
enough credit data to generate traditional FICO scores, about 15 million 
can be scored”). 
76 See Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance 
of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 109 (2014). 
77 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward A Positive Theory of Privacy 
Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021 (2013). 
78 See Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know 
About You?, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/GK3A-
MVMJ]. 
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alternative, more accurate ranking systems. The ubiquitous 
use of smartphones has accelerated the amount of data 
created and aggregated for lending purposes. A recent study 
found that eighty percent of online adults own a 
smartphone79 and sixty-four percent of Americans are 
smartphone users.80 Specifically, the percentage of 
smartphone and mobile phone users among the credit-
underserved is notably high: sixty-nine percent of the 
unbanked have been using a mobile phone, forty-nine 
percent of which are smartphones, and eighty-eight percent 
of the underbanked have access to mobile phones, sixty-four 
percent of which are smartphones.81 Despite their 
unsophisticated nature by today’s technological standards, 
even non-smartphone mobile phones generate data with 
outstanding predictive value. Lenders study and analyze 
factors like adhesion to airtime limits, voice usage, length of 
calls, and location to establish financial trustworthiness of 
loan candidates in the developing world.82 
The very grain of the data-driven lending market 
encompasses the notion that traditional methods take 
account of too few scoring indicators, leaving out many 
creditworthy borrowers who lack good (or any) credit 
histories. For underwriting, algorithms mine big data to 
score thousands of potential credit variables in relation to an 
individual’s attributes and behavior, such as the way 
 
79 See Ingrid Lunden, 80% Of All Online Adults Now Own A 
Smartphone, Less Than 10% Use Wearables, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/12/80-of-all-online-adults-now-own-a-
smartphone-less-than-10-use-wearables/ [http://perma.cc/7CDS-WBP2]. 
80 See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-
in-2015/ [http://perma.cc/8QLZ-6CCL]. 
81 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMERS AND 
MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 5 (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econ 
resdata/consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201403.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/KKP5-BWGW]. 
82 See Evgeny Morozov, Your Social Networking Credit Score, SLATE 
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/ 
2013/01/wonga_lenddo_lendup_big_data_and_social_networking_banking.
html [http://perma.cc/X4DJ-8N9Y]. 
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applicants click through web pages or file a loan 
application.83 Some start-ups incorporate baseline credit 
bureau data into their own data-fueled system, while others 
develop a stand-alone risk model to establish credit 
indicators for scoring and interest rate decisions.84 Lenders 
also experiment with sensor data derived from the “Internet 
of Things”85 to learn about their applicants’ 
creditworthiness.86 In addition, the very process of applying 
for credit opportunities has now become digitized. Potential 
customers apply quickly and efficiently online or through an 
app for virtually all of the new technology-centered lending 
companies. 
2. Marketplace Lending—Social Credit 
Utilizing big data for financial decision-making in a 
similar manner, some lenders have built their score-
 
83 See Alloway, supra note 9. See also Steve Lohr, Banking Start-Ups 
Adopt New Tools for Lending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/banking-start-ups-adopt-
new-tools-for-lending.html [http://perma.cc/F22F-ZAB7]. 
84 See ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA, 
UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 
12–14 (2014), https://www.teamupturn.com/static/files/Knowing_the_ 
Score_Oct_2014_v1_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y8TL-CURJ]. 
85 Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
Silicon Flatirons Conference: The New Frontiers of Privacy Harm (Jan. 17, 
2014), http://youtu.be/VXEyKGw8wXg [http://perma.cc/F335-E987] (“On 
the Internet of Things, consumers are going to start having devices, 
whether it’s their car, or some other tool that they have, that’s connected 
and sending information to a number of different entities, and the 
consumer might not even realize that they have a connected device or that 
the thing that they’re using is collecting information about them.”). 
86 See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 85, 122–23 (2014) (“For example, Safaricom, Kenya’s largest cell-
phone operator, studies its mobile phone users to establish their 
trustworthiness. Based on how often its customers top up their airtime, for 
example, it may then decide to extend them credit.”); see also Alloway, 
supra note 9 (“The use of wearable technologies, which can track 
everything from exercise habits to heart rate, is also opening up an other 
[sic] realm of information for data-hungry lenders.”). 
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generating algorithm around behavioral data gleaned from 
social media and social networking information. 
Anthropologists, behavioral economists, psychologists, and 
microfinance professionals support data collection and 
analysis as means to achieve better predictions of financial 
risk.87 Variables like education, career path, and the 
strength of social ties (such as the number of friends and 
followers and the information available about friends and 
followers) are just some of the many indicators gradually 
gaining traction in the move from a faceless credit score to a 
Facebook credit score.88 For example, FinTech lending 
companies use online social data to authenticate factual 
information submitted in loan applications and further verify 
trustworthiness.89 
One of the leaders in the social finance market is Lenddo, 
a Hong Kong-based startup that built a thriving lending 
business based on the analysis of online social footprints.90 
To apply for a loan, users authorize Lenddo to access their 
social media profiles. Lenddo then assesses the information 
and assigns a score that determines whether the applicant 
can receive a loan and the terms under which such a loan 
will be granted.91 Lenddo utilizes the network effect not only 
to judge the character of the candidate, but also to penalize 
default and reward repayment. For example, a failure to pay 
could trigger an alert that is applied to the user’s friends, 
whose own Lenddo scores would in turn be impaired by the 
default.92 LendUp, another lending startup, mixes data from 
 
87 See Groenfeldt, supra note 13. Similarly, in a more extreme 
manner, China has recently developed a new Social Credit System to 
leverage the explosion in personal data in order to improve citizens’ 
behavior and motivate adherence to the rules of Communist Party. Rogier 
Creemers, China tests “social credit score” system to crack down on critics, 
CNN (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/opinions/china-social-
credit-score-creemers/ [http://perma.cc/N56L-G58J]. 
88 See Rusli, supra note 10. 
89 See Morozov, supra note 82; see also Groenfeldt, supra note 13. 
90 See About the Company, LENDDO, http://www.lenddo.com/#about 
[http://perma.cc/68E2-X88B]. 
91 See Rusli, supra note 10. 
92 See id. 
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credit bureaus with reputational information mined from 
social networks.93 In contrast to Lenddo, allowing access to a 
candidate’s social network is not mandatory under LendUp’s 
policy. Applicants are nonetheless encouraged to fully 
disclose their social information because the more they 
reveal, the better their chances of approval.94 Neo95 and 
Earnest,96 U.S.-based lenders, similarly screen loan 
applicants using both their actual incomes and social 
network data. Kreditech, a German startup, vets microloan 
applications based on social and commerce data.97 Silicon 
 
93 See What We Do, LENDUP, https://www.lendup.com/en/about 
[https://perma.cc/N8WM-559W]. LendUp recently stated that while they 
have successfully experimented with the model, its potential grey-zone 
legal legitimacy prompted LendUp to not use social information in its 
“actual decision-making.” Telis Demos & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook 
Isn’t So Good at Judging Your Credit After All; Lenders drop plans to use 
social media to gauge creditworthiness as regulators balk; plus, one startup 
says, ‘It’s creepy,’ WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/lenders-drop-plans-to-judge-you-by-your-facebook-friends-1456309 
801 [http://perma.cc/NT9E-P5LD]. 
94 See Stephanie Armour, Borrowers Hit Social-Media Hurdles, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230 
4773104579266423512930050 [http://perma.cc/6H3W-Y9H2]. 
95 See About, NEO, https://neoverify.com/about [http://perma.cc/3ZNA-
3EYZ]; see also Martha C. White, Could Being Racist Make It Harder to 
Get a Loan?, TIME (Feb. 21, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/02/21/ 
could-being-racist-make-it-harder-to-get-a-loan/ [http://perma.cc/3PY3-
CXS8]. 
96 See How it Works, EARNEST, https://www.meetearnest.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/44EP-23TT]; see also Security & Privacy, EARNEST, 
https://www.meetearnest.com/privacy [https://perma.cc/5RDE-R4FG] 
(“You can connect your loan application to your accounts on third-party 
services, like LinkedIn, in which case we may collect and store information 
identifying your account with the third-party service. We may use the 
information to inform your application. When you connect an account with 
us, you are requesting our third-party financial aggregator, Intuit, to 
create a new ‘token’ for Earnest. That token gives access to view account 
information without giving permissions to perform any other action inside 
that account.”). 
97 See What We Do, KREDITECH, https://www.kreditech.com/what-we-
do/ [http://perma.cc/6BDL-FCTT] (“100% of smartphone or computer 
owners generate data by anything they do with that device (be it social 
media, surfing, ecommerce purchases, financial transactions, etc.). Our 
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Valley-based InVenture determines loan-applicants’ 
creditworthiness based on information extracted from their 
smartphones, such as the content of their text messages, 
emails, Facebook or Twitter updates and the frequency of 
calls to uncover behavior that correlates with the likelihood 
that a borrower will repay or default on a loan.98 Nigerian IT 
company BinCom developed a proprietary algorithm to 
calculate the social reputation score of loan seekers based 
primarily on the social information available about them and 
the duration of their social networking activity.99 BinCom 
licenses their “social lender” software to Nigerian banks in 
order to create a community where users can access soft 
loans based on their social reputation.100 
Further indicating the value of social information for 
creditors, Facebook recently secured a patent for technology 
to approve a loan based on a user’s social connections.101 The 
patent document explains the process: 
When an individual applies for a loan, the lender 
examines the credit ratings of members of the 
individual’s social network who are connected to the 
individual through authorized nodes. If the average 
credit rating of these members is at least a minimum 
credit score, the lender continues to process the loan 
application. Otherwise, the loan application is 
rejected.102 
 
proprietary algorithm factors in 20,000 data points, which are constantly 
changing based on newly identified patterns.”). 
98 Lee Mwiti, Why that Facebook post may give or deny you a loan, 
STANDARD DIGITAL (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 
business/article/2000191608/why-that-facebook-post-may-give-or-deny-
you-a-loan [http://perma.cc/824R-8CBM]. 
99 Gbenga Onalaja, Have You Been Good? Social Lender Gives You 




101 U.S. Patent No. 9,100,400 (filed Aug. 4, 2015). 
102 Id. 
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Even the most dominant provider of credit scoring 
models, FICO, recently announced it is increasingly valuing 
data at different levels, treating credit card repayment 
history as the most reliable indicator of creditworthiness 
and, far behind it but still part of the spectrum, examining 
information volunteered on social media platforms.103 
According to FICO’s chief executive, the number of times a 
person uses the word “wasted” in her profile has some 
predictive value—not determinative, but more than zero—for 
her loan repayment behavior.104 
Lenders also evaluate social media presence when 
making business loans. Lighter Capital,105 an online revenue 
lender for technology companies, integrates social media 
data, including a business’ LinkedIn page and consumer 
feedback, into its underwriting algorithm.106 In addition, 
small businesses creditor Kabbage factors real-time 
information from bank accounts, social networks, and web 
analytical services into its risk analysis.107 Credit reporting 
agency Experian is working on a business loan program that 
incorporates data from Yelp, Facebook, Twitter, and 
FourSquare to compare a business with others of the same 
 
103 See McLannahan, supra note 15. 
104 Id. 
105 See What’s a RevenueLoan®?, LIGHTER CAPITAL, https://www.lighter 
capital.com/how-it-works/overview/ [http://perma.cc/N96G-TRAG]. 
106 Penny Crosman, Business Lender Finds Trove of Insights in Client 
CRM Data, AM. BANKER (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.american 
banker.com/issues/178_175/business-lender-finds-trove-of-insights-in-
client-crm-data-1061933-1.html [http://perma.cc/UG3P-PFRS]. 
107 See KABBAGE, https://www.kabbage.com/ [http://perma.cc/T8XM-
TYZL]; see also Darren Dahl, The Six-Minute Loan: How Kabbage Is 
Upending Small Business Lending—And Building A Very Big Business, 
FORBES (May 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrendahl/2015/05/ 
06/the-six-minute-loan-how-kabbage-is-upending-small-business-lending-
and-building-a-very-big-business/ [http://perma.cc/WN4D-UFJN]; Letter 
from Rob Frohein, CEO of Kabbage, Inc., and Kathryn Petralia, COO of 
Kabbage, Inc., to Laura Temel, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Re: 
Marketplace Lending RFI (Sept. 30, 2015), http://src.bna.com/SG [http:// 
perma.cc/S82E-X6VA]. 
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type.108 Experian will offer the program to all its customers, 
including traditional banks.109 
Pure data-analysis start-ups, such as the U.K.-based 
Hello Soda, also evidence the link between online social 
footprints and financial evaluation. According to Hello Soda, 
their product, PROFILE, offers lenders the ability to gauge 
an applicant’s creditworthiness by identifying personality 
attributes from the language exhibited across their social 
media.110 It might be the case that the value of the ranking 
algorithm exceeds that of the lending business itself. Indeed, 
Lenddo, the exemplifier of social data-driven lending, has 
recently abandoned its lending arm in lieu of selling its 
algorithmic services to businesses inside and outside the 
financial sector.111 
III. CONSUMERS’ RESPONSES TO SOCIAL CREDIT 
Social credit systems are built around a promising idea: 
using personal information about consumers’ social 
footprints, contacts, and activities from the consumers 
themselves. Recent studies support this approach, showing 
that in order to gain specific transactional and personal 
advantages most individuals will willingly disclose 
information about themselves and their social activities 
 
108 See Murakami, supra note 16. 
109 See id. 
110 See Financial Services, HELLO SODA, http://hellosoda.com/alter 
native-finance/ [http://perma.cc/8QML-UPWS]. 
111 See Judith Balea, Lenddo stops lending, now helps clients 
determine customer trustworthiness, TECH IN ASIA (Jan. 26, 2015, 10:30 
PM), https://www.techinasia.com/lenddo-customer-trustworthiness/ [http:// 
perma.cc/MNB8-46ZM]. Aside from some banks that already use Lenddo’s 
algorithm, Lenddo targets telecommunications companies, e-commerce 
sites, online dating sites, and hiring managers. See id. Business creditor 
Kabbage also plans to license or sell its scoring methods to banks. See 
JoAnn McFarland, Need a Small Business Loan? Kabbage Recently Raised 
$135 Million, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://smallbiz 
trends.com/2015/10/kabbage-investment-funding.html [http://perma.cc/ 
UMM8-FDRW]. 
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without thinking about the effects of their disclosures.112 
People also enthusiastically partake in profiling for a variety 
of purposes,113 including the receipt of financial benefits and 
discounts. Businesses offer these benefits and discounts in 
exchange for information because receiving all the 
information required for a proper due diligence analysis 
directly from the subject enables businesses to reduce 
transaction costs. Yet few individuals understand the 
significant consequences of businesses using their sensitive 
information.114 Most consumers lack both the information 
and the skills to properly evaluate this decision.115 
It is a basic premise in economic theories that rational 
actors economize on transaction costs.116 Businesses and 
 
112 See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 17, at 1157–58 (citing ROBERT H. 
FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 104 (1988)). 
113 See Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of 
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2008). 
114 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined 
Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the 
Facebook, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 36 (George Danezis & 
Philippe Golle eds., 2006); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What 
Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us about Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: 
THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 
2007); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26–33 (Jan./Feb. 
2005). 
115 Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 241, 267 n. 142 (2007). 
116 Since, in most real-world situations, transaction costs are not 
negligible, the initial allocation of rights matter and parties will have 
difficulty contracting around established rules. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, 
Libertarianism, Law and Economics, and the Common Law, 16 CHAP. L. 
REV. 309 (2013). Accordingly, high transaction costs, which include 
information costs, may lead to less than desirable situations. For example, 
high transaction and information costs can prevent plaintiffs from suing 
and fully recovering, or properly negotiating and bargaining over various 
issues. See, e.g., Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal Liability 
to Inform Food Safety Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 728 (2013). Coase 
argued that in a world with low transaction costs, it really does not matter 
how the rights are initially allocated and that, once allocated, parties can 
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consumers constantly attempt to adopt models or methods 
that will help them minimize costs. In recent years, many 
businesses in different industries have creatively come up 
with strategies that provide short-term rewards for 
consumers that agree to share useful information. The last 
few years have shown an increase in consumers’ doxing 
themselves and their contacts in return for incentives, 
discounts, and other benefits. This strategy’s success has the 
potential to make social credit systems mainstream, 
especially if social credit algorithms prove to be accurate and 
profitable.117  
To better understand the possible implications of these 
systems and strategies, this Part sets forth an analysis of 
consumers’ reactions to social credit and examines their 
behavior in personal information markets. Specifically, the 
analysis looks at consumers’ willingness or unwillingness to 
use social networks, given social credit’s financial and social 
aspects. In addition to examining the incentives and bounded 
rationality of consumers,118 this Part emphasizes the 
financial and social consequences of a consumer’s decision to 
participate in or avoid social networks.119 We use insights 
from law and economics, largely building upon the 
 
then bargain to an efficient allocation of rights. See generally R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. & ECON. 837 (1960). 
117 A 2015 study by a group of researchers from the University of 
Pennsylvania found that the impact of using network-based measures on 
customer score accuracy is ambiguous. Yanhao Wei et al., Credit Scoring 
with Social Network Data, 35 MARKETING SCI. 234 (2015), http://pubs 
online.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mksc.2015.0949 [https://perma.cc/F659-
WBP4]. Some lenders have recently voiced doubts as to the effectiveness of 
social-media data as the sole source to judge creditworthiness. See Demos 
& Seetharaman, supra note 93. Nevertheless, many businesses admittedly 
make use of social information as an additional source of information. 
Furthermore, the consequences described in this Article are likely to 
materialize even if social information is not the main factor driving credit 
determination. 
118 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–79 (1998), for a description of 
bounded rationality and bounded will-power. 
119 See Julie Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 241, 243 (2012). 
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assumption of individual rationality. In predicting 
consumers’ preferences, behavioral law and economics also 
contribute concepts useful for exploring the legal and policy 
implications of departures from rational choice behavior.120 
In particular, findings in behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology show individuals sometimes make decisions that 
are different from what they would have made if they had 
complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no 
lack of willpower.121 Given that consumers are prone to 
incomplete knowledge, cognitive bias, and passiveness, 
behavioral law and economic analysis may complete the 
picture drawn by rationality theories and help explain 
decisions about social credit. 
A. Rationality and Decision-making 
Before moving on to analyze consumers’ decision-making 
processes, we will lay out the theoretical foundations for this 
analysis. In general, rational actions and beliefs are defined 
as “guided by reason, principles, fairness, [or] logic,” while 
irrational decisions and beliefs are not.122 The definition 
appears to be straightforward. Yet past decades have seen 
countless disagreements among scholars from different 
 
120 See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35 (2012) (explaining that the “behavioral law 
and economics regulatory agenda reflects a common philosophical source—
so-called libertarian paternalism,” and attempts to “regulate so as to 
improve economic welfare by more closely aligning each individual’s actual 
choices with his ‘true’ or unbiased preferences without reducing his 
liberty, at least as it is represented by the choices available to him.” 
Wright & Ginsburg argue, however, that “so long as libertarian 
paternalism ignores the economic welfare and liberty value of allowing 
individuals the freedom to err, it will fail to achieve its goal of increasing 
welfare without reducing liberty and will pose a significant risk of 
reducing both.”). 
121 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2003). 
122 Rational, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 400–01 (2011). 
See also Rational, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 661 
(3d ed. 1999). 
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schools of thought as to what it means for individuals to 
behave in a rational way.123 The neoclassical economic theory 
builds upon the foundational assumption that economic 
individuals are rational maximizers of utility.124 In a world of 
“perfect competition,” goes the claim, economic individuals 
are presumed to all be somewhat similar, never err, and 
avoid any information costs. As a result, the model predicts 
that resources are always and instantly directed to their 
highest value use.125 However, because competitive activities 
of economic agents in the real world rarely conform to the 
definition of perfect competition, many criticize the 
neoclassical economic theory as unhelpful.126 
In the last half of the twentieth century, following 
decades of focus on the roles of markets and governments in 
allocating resources, scholars started extending neoclassical 
theory to incorporate some issues identified in real-world 
markets.127 The broadening of the theory has factored in the 
 
123 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics 
Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147 (2000) (contrasting Judge Richard 
Posner’s conception of rational choice theory with those of a number of 
scholars who support models of rationality, such as Gary Becker, Ronald 
Coase, Paul Samuelson, and George Stigler, as well as scholars who are 
critical of the rational choice literature, such as Amartya Sen and Herbert 
Simon). 
124 Utility is the level of satisfaction that an individual achieves from 
consuming a good or undertaking an activity. See Ronald H. Coase, The 
New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 
229, 231 (1984). However, note that Coase himself rejects this idea. 
125 See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY 
ECONOMICS 114 (3d ed. 1972). 
126 See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 141, 142 (1988) (explaining that the neoclassical model is 
better described as a model that demonstrates the relative efficiency of 
decentralized allocation of resources). 
127 See Daron Acemoglu et al., Markets Versus Governments, 55 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 159, 159–61 (2008) (explaining that according to the 
classical economic approach building on Adam Smith’s invisible hand 
theory and the first welfare theorem, under certain conditions, free 
competition will achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. Arguing 
that this concept is too optimistic, economists such as Arthur Pigou 
maintained that externalities and market failures lead to inefficiencies 
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cost of information, as well as the impact of mistakes and 
irrational behavior in the process of consumers’ decision-
making.128 Certain scholars expanded the price-theoretic 
framework to show its tools were not only consistent with, 
but also useful for, examining detected irrational behavior.129 
Another group of scholars developed theories critical of the 
rational choice literature, arguing individuals do not have 
the cognitive abilities to properly analyze all that is needed 
in order to maximize their welfare.130 Gradually, the 
economic literature introduced new concepts and explained a 
new form of bounded rationality different from the one 
described in price theory.131 Scholars such as Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky further developed these 
heuristics-related concepts in the modern research of 
behavioral economics, referred to as “prospect theory.”132 In 
prospect theory, cognitive biases, based on empirical 
 
and may require government intervention. Others, inspired by socialist 
ideas, such as Oskar Lange, argued that a government-operated 
mechanism that allocates resources is superior to free competition, but 
were criticized by economists such as Abba Lerner, Friedrich von Hayek, 
and Jacob Marschak. Building up on this debate, the mechanism design 
approach to economics was developed. In the 1960s to 1970s, Leonid 
Hurwicz attempted to develop a theory for the conditions under which 
markets provide the best possible resource allocation systems. Later 
inputs by scholars such as Myerson, Harris, Townsend, Baron, Dasgupta, 
Hammond, Maskin, Green, and Laffont, helped advance the theory of 
mechanism design.). 
128 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 3–16 (1953); Armen A. Alchian, 
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 220–
21 (1950); Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. 
POL. ECON. 1, 12–13 (1962); George J. Stigler, The Economics of 
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
129 See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 120, at 1037. 
130 See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business 
Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 495 (1979); see also Herbert A. 
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99–100 
(1955). 
131 See, e.g., RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL 
THEORY OF THE FIRM 10 (2d ed. 1992). 
132 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274–84 (1979). 
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research, explain departures from rationality.133 The 
empirical support led behaviorists to believe that prospect 
theory, which incorporates comparatively more realistic 
psychological accounts of economic actors, would have 
greater predictive power than that of an economic theory 
based on a hypothesis of individual rationality.134 Continuing 
this line of scholarship in recent years, various scholars, 
including Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, have 
contributed to the elaboration of what is now considered to 
be a massive behavioral law and economics body of 
literature.135 Sunstein and Thaler also coined the term 
“libertarian paternalism,” with the goal of developing “an 
approach that preserves freedom of choice but that 
authorizes both private and public institutions to steer 
people in directions that will promote their welfare.”136 
 
133 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness 
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds., 2002); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–36 
(1990). 
134 See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 120, at 1040. 
135 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo 
Economicus, in FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: HOW DO 
ECONOMISTS DO ECONOMICS? 227 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. 
Samuels eds., 1996); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 
(2004); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 121; Richard Thaler, Mental 
Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985). 
136 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 179 (2003). Many scholars have criticized this 
concept. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government 
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1620 (2006); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2005); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 120, 
at 1041 (“The behavioral law and economics literature exhibits a strong 
tendency to ignore the social benefits of error. At the same time, it tends to 
overestimate the social costs of errors.”). 
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B. To Network or Not to Network 
Traditional law and economics rests on the assumption 
that pursuant to a set of consistent preferences, individuals 
attempt to maximize their utility. Utility is commonly 
defined as the level of satisfaction they obtain from selecting 
a certain activity or product, based upon preferences. 
Individuals in financial markets are no different: they too 
adapt to the behavior of other players in the market and to 
the legal rules that govern their behavior in an attempt to 
maximize their utility.137 Rational individuals are expected 
to respond in one of two ways to the rise of a shadow credit 
system that heavily relies on their social qualities. The first 
type would avoid social networks or actively minimize her 
online social footprints as a means to prioritize other, more 
valuable interests. The second type would act to achieve the 
highest possible social score for herself by portraying an 
online image of creditworthy social circles.138 
1. Type A—Rational and Maximizing Non-
Financial Utility 
The first group of rational individuals, referred to as Type 
A, includes individuals who, when applying for a loan, would 
maximize their utility by prioritizing privacy or other non-
monetary interests above saving transaction costs. Type A 
individuals would act to minimize their online social 
footprint, make themselves untraceable, completely avoid 
social interactions online, or consciously refuse to make 
changes to their online social persona.139 As with other 
alternative underwriting methods, determining the social-
based score of a loan seeker requires a detailed due diligence 
process that comes with extra costs. Collecting sufficient and 
 
137 See Gerding, supra note 18, at 179. 
138 Id. (noting that, in general terms, such adaptive response means 
to look for innovative ways to game the system and achieve abnormal 
returns). 
139 For the contrasting approach of Type B individuals, see Part 
III.B.2.  
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relevant information about social attributes to analyze 
creditworthiness reassigns some of the data analysis work 
from efficient automated systems back to human hands. It 
also necessitates a return to traditional underwriting models 
that are less efficient and costlier in terms of processing than 
those offered by alternative lenders. Thus, the lower the 
place privacy or other interests have in an applicant’s 
preferences list, the more readily available relevant 
information on the applicant is found via social networks and 
big data aggregators, the simpler the process of obtaining 
and analyzing information to assess an applicant’s 
creditworthiness is, and the cheaper the related transaction 
costs are. 
Because lower transaction costs mean fewer costs would 
be passed on to loan seekers, many individuals would prefer 
that lenders calculate a social credit score for them using 
social networks. Maximizing utility by prioritizing a discount 
or other benefits over privacy has proved to be a viable 
business model for many businesses, including Progressive’s 
car insurance.140 By placing the highest utility value on 
privacy or other non-monetary interests such as ideological 
social networks avoidance, Type A individuals pay the price 
of having the transaction costs for the due diligence 
processes rolled over to them. These additional costs would 
be further intensified by dynamics of “unraveling.”141  
In a world where social credit slowly becomes more and 
more mainstream, individuals may increasingly choose to 
over-disclose information on social networks, both because of 
custom and because the equilibrium in the marketplace 
would tilt toward disclosure as a condition of market 
entry.142 As a result, Type A individuals, who maximize their 
utility by prioritizing non-monetary values, would suffer 
from an increasingly costly financial penalty for doing so. 
 
140 See Robert Passikoff, Progressive Adds ‘Bad Driver’ Surveillance to 
Snapshot Telematics, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robertpassikoff/2015/03/31/progressive-adds-bad-driver-surveillance-to-
snapshot-telematics/ [http://perma.cc/5J6H-XMEV]. 
141 See Peppet, supra note 17, at 1176. 
142 See id. 
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The more mainstream social credit becomes, the more likely 
the unraveling dynamic would prevail, allowing only wealthy 
individuals to protect their privacy. These individuals can 
afford to organize their preferences in a way that incurs 
substantial financial costs to protect privacy. Many less 
financially secure individuals, even while sharing similar 
views regarding the importance of privacy, would not be able 
to bear the expense of added transaction costs passed on to 
them. Relying on this rationale, we argue that Type A 
individuals have essentially bought for themselves a right to 
be unnetworked, as explained infra in Part VII, because they 
can afford it. Unlike Type A individuals, Type B individuals 
that act to improve their perceived online persona would 
enjoy lower transaction costs. By deviating from pure 
financial utility maximization, Type A individuals knowingly 
opt for less than ideal financial terms. 
2. Type B—Rational and Socially Practical 
The second group of rational individuals, labeled as Type 
B, includes individuals who use social networks and 
maximize their utility by prioritizing savings to gain 
financial advantages. Indeed, recognizing the far-reaching 
effects of credit scores on their financial lives, consumers 
tend to be very mindful of their credit.143 In fact, access to 
credit reports, which are valuable sources of information for 
consumers, has even been cited as a fundamental right.144 A 
consumer with a better understanding of her credit standing 
 
143 Consumers feel their reports are relevant to their lives to a great 
extent and wish they had more power to affect them. See generally 
Vanessa G. Perry & Marlene Morris, Who is in Control?: The Role of Self-
perception, Knowledge, and Income in Explaining Consumer Behavior, 39 
J. CONSUMER AFF. 299 (2005). 
144 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF HOW THE NATION’S 
LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS MANAGE CONSUMER DATA (2012). The CFPB has 
also reported that approximately twenty-six million consumers buy or 
obtain credit reports from commercial credit monitoring services. 
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is better equipped to shop for better credit terms.145 
Consumers who monitor their credit reports can also identify 
potential errors or problems in a credit file and make 
corrections quickly to improve their credit score.146 Moreover, 
consumers can access information that can prove useful in 
helping improve and better manage their credit obligations, 
and, consequently, their credit standing.147 Currently in the 
consumer credit market, consumers are mindful of their 
credit score and aspire to improve it if possible, or at least 
attempt to avoid taking actions that would have a negative 
impact on their scores. Studies have shown that consumers 
generally understand the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
elements of their financial histories in their credit report.148 
Some recent news reports headlines describe a new era in 
social credit systems in which “your deadbeat Facebook 
friends could cost you a loan,”149 or alternatively, “[y]our 
Facebook friends could be the ticket to your next loan.”150 
Upon learning about social credit and the main factors 
considered, Type B individuals would become more mindful 
of what can help them obtain and maintain a better credit 
score. Type B consumers, who prioritize savings and seek to 
achieve the best financial terms, would likely delete 
“deadbeat” friends and all other potentially tolling friends 
who could negatively affect their credit score.151 Indeed, a 
 
145 See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER VOICES ON 





148 See id. at 12. 
149 See Erika Eichelberger, Your Deadbeat Facebook Friends Could 
Cost You a Loan, MOTHERJONES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.mother 
jones.com/politics/2013/09/lenders-vet-borrowers-social-media-facebook 
[http://perma.cc/F4D5-YZ5S]. 
150 See Kia Kokalitcheva, Your Facebook friends could be the ticket to 
your next loan, FORTUNE (Aug. 4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/04/ 
facebook-loan-approval-network/ [http://perma.cc/E6SF-74H5]. 
151 Such an inference is further supported by a group of economists 
who found that social credit is likely to make online friendships more 
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social credit world affords very little room for social 
mistakes. With this understanding, Type B individuals 
would quickly warm up to the possibility of a complete social 
cleanup of their online circles. However, merely deleting 
contacts is not enough to significantly improve one’s credit 
standing. Thus, further adaptation is expected. Just as 
consumers understand and act upon the negative 
consequences of not paying a past due bill, Type B 
individuals will constantly have the social credit concept on 
their minds. As a result, they would not only manicure their 
existing network, but also avoid adding new contacts, and 
possibly even avoid forming new offline friendships with 
individuals perceived as financial red flags. 
Such adaptation in consumer behavior would be neither 
surprising nor a first. Rational individuals try to better their 
positions in various aspects of life by harnessing different 
systems to their advantage. Empirical evidence of players’ 
behavior in other markets support the assumption that 
rational consumers will adapt their behavior to new social 
credit standards and norms. Players in other markets, 
understanding the link between online influence and the 
social standing and future prospects, have already 
demonstrated a propensity to maximize financial gain. 
Examples of such markets include: (i) education enrollment, 
(ii) human resources, and (iii) insurance. 
It is a well-established truth that the university 
admission process includes careful examination of an 
applicant’s online social activities, contacts, profile, and 
posts. On top of traditional factors that admission officers 
factor into their decisions, they have admittedly started to 
look into indications about students’ extracurricular 
activities, judgment calls, and other relevant pieces of 
information extracted from students’ social media and digital 
footprints.152 Oftentimes a candidate’s poor judgment 
 
socioeconomically homogeneous. As a result, social credit scores would 
become better predictors of true credit risk and improve credit availability. 
See Wei et al., supra note 117. 
152 See Victor Luckerson, When Colleges Look Up Applicants on 
Facebook: The Unspoken New Admissions Test, TIME (Nov. 15, 2012), 
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displayed online can cause an institution to deny a 
candidate. Admissions officials report that they have 
occasionally rejected applicants or revoked their acceptances 
because of online materials, saying, for example, that “[i]t’s 
something that is becoming more ubiquitous and less looked 
down upon.”153 Not surprisingly, students are realizing the 
stakes and responding to the background check by shoring 
up their online social presence.154 Specifically, a recent study 
found that students believed cleaning up their Facebook 
presence or other social media profiles improved their 
admission prospects; many took active measures to delete, 
edit, or otherwise alter their social media profiles, including 





153 See Natasha Singer, They Loved Your G.P.A. Then They Saw Your 
Tweets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/ 
business/they-loved-your-gpa-then-they-saw-your-tweets.html [http://per 
ma.cc/JVQ3-VBKD] (“Of 381 college admissions officers who answered a 
Kaplan telephone questionnaire this year, 31 percent said they had visited 
an applicant’s Facebook or other personal social media page to learn more 
about them—a five-percentage-point increase from last year. More 
crucially for those trying to get into college, 30 percent of the admissions 
officers said they had discovered information online that had negatively 
affected an applicant’s prospects.”). 
154 See, e.g., id. (“If you’ve got stuff online you don’t want colleges to 
see . . . deleting it is kind of like joining two more clubs senior year to list 
on your application to try to make you seem more like the person they 
want at their schools.”); see also #Accepted: The Changing Role of Social 
Media in College Admissions, EDUC. ADVISORY BD. (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.eab.com/daily-briefing/2014/11/24/accepted-the-changing-role-
of-social-media-in-college-admissions [http://perma.cc/3NQJ-VJPK] (“More 
college admissions staff are looking at applicants’ social media profiles, but 
students are getting savvier about sanitizing their online images.”). 
155 See Katherine Kiang & Marissa Page, Are Colleges Really 
Creeping on Your Facebook?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2013), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/colleges-facebook_n_4228586.html 
[http://perma.cc/QQ6D-T89] (explaining that, when asked what actions 
they have taken or plan to take to safeguard their online presence, 
students responded that 21.6% change their searchable name, 21.9% 
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for millennial branding, and many individuals understand 
they should use it to their advantage. Effective branding in 
this context also means carefully picking contacts, because 
“bad” friends can take a toll on one’s online reputation.156 
In the job market, reviewing potential candidates’ online 
social accounts is already standard for many human 
resources and recruiting offices. Most interviewers check out 
applicants on social networks and scan their profiles for any 
issues that may raise a red flag.157 According to research 
done by the Society for Human Resource Management, 
approximately three quarters of companies surveyed 
confessed to using social networking sites to recruit job 
candidates, and a fifth of the companies surveyed also 
admitted to using social media to screen or background check 
job applicants.158 Similarly, major human resources and 
recruiting companies openly state on their websites that they 
frequently examine use of mainstream social media 
platforms for hiring purposes.159 The U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) started 
examining this issue in March 2014,160 and courts have also 
started to hear cases dealing with improper use of social 
 
change their public profile picture, 26.4% untag themselves in photos, and 
12.1% delete their Facebook or other social media accounts). 
156 See Emily Driscoll, Attention College Applicants: Admissions Can 
See Your Facebook Page, FOX BUS. (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.fox 
business.com/personal-finance/2011/03/23/attention-college-applicants-
admissions-facebook-page/ [http://perma.cc/65JL-KV9M]. 
157 See Molly Triffin, 8 reasons you weren’t hired, MARKET WATCH 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/7-reasons-you-werent-
hired-2015-02-12 [http://perma.cc/C7TD-JPUV]. See also Kathryn Barcroft 
& Barrie Dnistrian, The EEOC Hears Concerns About Social Media and 
Hiring, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.cohengresser.com/assets/ 
publications/aaa.pdf [http://perma.cc/N4PB-4SMW] (“Because a qualified 
job candidate may not have considered his future job prospects when he 
posted lewd Mardi Gras photos . . . or took to Twitter to rail against 
President Obama in 2012, a quick check of social media by a recruitment 
manager could sink an otherwise certain offer of employment.”). 
158 Id. 
159 See, e.g., id.; ENTELO, https://www.entelo.com [http://perma.cc/BU 
95-X9TC]. 
160 Triffin, supra note 157. 
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media during the hiring process, focusing on employers’ 
discriminatory use of social media in deciding between 
candidates.161 As a result, job applicants should maintain 
and use their social profiles in a conservative fashion. Many 
job seekers affirm that they are scrubbing their online 
resumes by making changes to their social networking 
accounts or increasing privacy settings to prevent potential 
employers from accessing their personal information.162 
Online social information is similarly used in the 
insurance market when investigating claims. Insurers are 
checking whether the individuals involved in liability issues 
have taken reasonable steps to protect themselves.163 Some 
have gone so far as to designate an internal team of cyber-
analysts to inquire into a person’s digital activities and learn 
whether individuals are lying about injury claims.164 Others 
have used services from external specialty firms to obtain 
“dirt” on individuals.165 Accordingly, insured and third 
parties should refrain from sharing certain content on social 
networks while involved in an insurance claim. Even 
insurance organizations recommend thinking carefully about 
the content posted on one’s social media accounts.166 
 
161 Id. 
162 See Stephanie Goldberg, Young job-seekers hiding their Facebook 
pages, CNN (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/03/29/ 
facebook.job-seekers/ [http://perma.cc/7FQH-CGPR]. According to Jobvite’s 
Job Seeker Nation Study, forty percent of job seekers have modified their 
social media presence in some way, and seventeen percent have deleted 
specific content. See JOBVITE, JOB SEEKER NATION STUDY (2014), 
http://web.jobvite.com/rs/jobvite/images/2014%20Job%20Seeker%20Survey
.pdf [http://perma.cc/C35A-G9JR]. 
163 See Robin Ash, Online Holiday Snaps May Cost Dearly, Insurers 
Warn, TIMES (London) (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/ 
tto/money/insurance/article4420650.ece [https://perma.cc/2QAK-VMAP]. 
164 See Rob Shaw, Internet Reduces ICBC’s Need for Private 
Investigators, VANCOUVER SUN (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.vancouver 
sun.com/technology/Internet+reduces+ICBC+need+private+investigators/1
0995448/story.html?__lsa=0fda-7a3b [http://perma.cc/C8LV-FL8N]. 
165 See, e.g., What We Do, NOVARICA, http://novarica.com/ [http:// 
perma.cc/2QCE-UHUD]. 
166 Rebecca Perring, No ‘hot-dog legs’—Keep holiday selfies OFF 
Facebook or have insurance claims REJECTED, DAILY EXPRESS (London) 
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Concealing, editing, or deleting online social information 
continues to play a role even when such claims mature into 
actual litigation. For example, the Florida Bar’s Professional 
Ethics Committee recently discussed this matter, at the 
request of a Florida attorney who handles personal injury 
and wrongful death cases.167 The committee ultimately 
confirmed that an attorney could advise her client to tighten 
privacy settings and to conceal information relevant to the 
foreseeable proceeding from social media accounts as long as 
an appropriate record is maintained and no rules or 
substantive laws regarding the preservation and/or 
spoliation of evidence are broken.168 
3. Type C—Lazy, Idealistic, Or Benefiting in A 
Different Way 
While traditional law and economics assumes that 
individuals attempt to maximize their utility based upon 
preferences, behavioral law and economics finds that 
deviations from such behavior commonly occur. These 
departures typically relate to well-researched and long-
recognized types of cognitive bias, which include 
contextualization effects169 and self-control errors.170 
 
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/572365/Holiday-
insurance-claims-rejected-selfies-Facebook [http://perma.cc/8254-F84E]. 
167 See Brian Karpf, Florida’s Take On Telling Clients To Scrub Social 




169 Frequently described as “framing effects,” these effects occur when 
individuals face an identical set of options to choose from and select 
different options in different contexts. See Jolls et al., supra note 118. 
170 Self-control errors include errors in decisions about allocating 
resources over time. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 13, 24–26 
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003). Such errors also include optimism 
bias. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806–07 (1980). 
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Type C individuals are consumers who are likely to 
depart from rational choice behavior by avoiding social 
networks or not improving their online social impression. 
Type C individuals mirror the behavior of Type A 
individuals, who avoid social networks or refuse to make 
changes to their online persona. But unlike Type A 
individuals, the choice exhibited by Type C is not a rational 
one. Instead, they are passive, lazy, or lack understanding of 
technological and financial advancements. 
Those who avoid social networking do not properly 
appreciate the context, meaning, and nature of social credit. 
They might not understand that missing out on social 
networking means more than not being able to see newly 
posted pictures of their grandchildren or share interesting 
news articles. Because they never joined a social network, 
there is less readily available information on those Type C 
users online, and thus it is costlier for lenders to assess their 
creditworthiness. As explained above, such information 
scarcity forces lenders to spend higher transaction costs on 
due diligence and pass these costs on to the applicants. Had 
these Type C applicants rationally analyzed the social credit 
ecosystem, they might have reconsidered their avoidance. 
There are also Type C individuals who would continue to 
network freely online without changing their past or future 
social networking standards despite the potential negative 
impact to their credit scores. If minimally informed about the 
main factors coming into play in a social credit analysis, 
there is no rational explanation for such a behavior, given 
(i) the relatively negligible effort that is associated with 
modifying one’s own social network accounts, and (ii) the 
ensuing negative financial consequences. 
4. Type D—Non-Tech Savvy and Lemons? 
Also deviating from the behavior rational choice behavior, 
Type D individuals would avoid online social networking 
because of poor strategic reasoning. Those individuals realize 
they are not strong candidates for a high social credit score 
and hence avoid social networks as a game plan to conceal 
negative information. In an environment of information-
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seeking lenders, a simplified understanding of credit 
underwriting would view risk assessment as conducted by 
classifying consumers into “good” or “bad” groups. The good 
group consists of those who are extremely creditworthy and 
pose minimal risk. The bad group consists of those who are 
not creditworthy and do pose risks. By concealing 
information, Type D individuals hope to move from the bad 
group to the good group.  
In reality, however, all defendants are under a cloud of 
suspicion as lenders gather information and compile their 
credit score. As a result, the good group will want to 
differentiate themselves by disclosing information, while the 
information-seeking lenders will simultaneously prefer that 
they do so.171
 
When the good group signals they are 
creditworthy, the concealing strategy of the bad group turns 
out to be irrational. Such a strategy would likely backfire, as 
lenders would believe those consumers’ credit scores are 
worse than they are in reality. Indeed, lenders would view 
them as lemons.172 
IV. PRIVACY-RELATED HARMS 
The utilization of social information for financial ranking 
purposes poses a number of policy challenges, the first of 
which relates to privacy issues that would directly result 
from the rational choice behavior of Type B individuals. At 
the direct level, the social credit apps have an obvious impact 
on the loan seeker’s privacy; they accrue and survey data to 
 
171 See Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1309 (2005). 
172 The “buyers,” who are often the buyers of potential goods or 
services (in our situation, the lenders, who are the information-seekers) 
lack and cannot detect information the “sellers” (consumers) have. In the 
lemons problem, given the lack of information, the prices one is willing to 
pay with less information fall and the good products drop out, leaving only 
lemons. This lemons argument has been used in many disciplines. For a 
lemons argument in the context of juvenile records, see T. Markus Funk & 
Daniel D. Polsby, Distributional Consequences of Expunging Juvenile 
Delinquency Records: The Problem of Lemons, 52 WASH U. J. URBAN & 
CONTEMP. L. 161, 166 (1997). 
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learn about applicants’ marital status, family ties, 
friendships, jobs, shopping preferences, political stances, and 
more. As opposed to other applications of big data that 
aggregate and anonymize information, the use of social 
intelligence for financial ranking is dependent upon personal 
identification. Some apps ask for the loan seeker’s login 
passcodes and then scan her entire activity, including not 
only visible online footprints but also private exchanges.173 
Others simply notify the applicant that their risk analysis 
takes into account her online social image. 
A. Direct Privacy Effect 
At the direct level of interaction between the loan seeker 
and the lender, the penetration into the former’s private 
matters is justified against the backdrop of her conspicuous 
consent. This is a simple and in many ways reasonable 
transaction: one barters the private details of one’s life for 
better interest rates. Trading away personal information in 
return for products or services is not new and has long been 
a dominant model in other markets. A very common example 
is the behavioral advertising business model, in which 
advertising is selected and displayed based on information 
about the individual user.174 Data is often collected based on 
a consensual exchange, in which personal information is 
used as currency to pay for various products and services.175 
Critics challenge this assumption, arguing that users cannot 
reasonably estimate their disutility from the tradeoff and the 
harm associated with the data collection.176 Unlike a common 
retail transaction, the ongoing nature of the “payment” (i.e., 
data collection) that is not completed at the point of purchase 
 
173 At some point Lenddo, for example, checked messages for shared 




174 Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s 
Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 100 (2013). 
175 Id. at 106. 
176 Id. at 107. 
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further obstructs users’ ability to appreciate the privacy 
harm.177 
While those arguments have some merit in the behavioral 
advertising context, they lose much of it when applied to 
data collection by social credit services. The social credit 
framework is predicated on a different kind of information 
sharing: to be considered for a loan, a candidate must 
interact closely with the service, fill out an application, 
browse through the app or webpage to learn about the 
various products, and then select those suitable for her 
needs. As opposed to the passive, often oblivious sharing of 
information presented by the behavioral advertising 
business model, applicants for social credit-based loans 
engage in an active, voluntary, and better-informed sharing 
of personal details. From a user’s perspective, this 
information is shared and the subsequent surveillance is 
agreed to at low or no apparent cost for a clear economic 
reward. 
Businesses built around consensual disclosure of 
previously unavailable information in return for a discount 
or other financial incentive exist and flourish in other 
markets as well. An example of this model is Progressive 
Snapshot.178 The insurance company Progressive 
Corporation has gone beyond calculating risk based on one’s 
accident record and created a voluntary driver-monitoring 
program called Snapshot. Consumers who choose to enroll 
receive a personalized insurance rate from Progressive based 
on their safe driving habits as recorded by a small box 
plugged into their vehicle.179 Data about a driver’s mileage, 
vehicle speed, timing of driving (day or night), and frequency 
of hard braking is amassed and analyzed to establish one’s 
driving patterns and accordingly estimate the risk posed to 
 
177 Id. at 130–31. 
178 See PROGRESSIVE, https://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot/ 
[http://perma.cc/R63Q-23AD]. 
179 See Snapshot Terms and Conditions, PROGRESSIVE, https://www. 
progressive.com/auto/snapshot-terms-conditions/ [http://perma.cc/H4VZ-
SM68]. 
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the insurance company.180 Additional data such as record 
location information is collected in some devices for research 
and development purposes, and Progressive states that it 
would retain information collected or derived from the device 
indefinitely.181 The Snapshot program seems to have gained 
traction, with more than 2.5 million enrolled drivers that 
share information about their habits to get better premium 
rates.182 
Authorizing collection and use of personal information in 
exchange for an economic benefit makes perfect economic 
sense to some consumers.183 As those exchanges materialize 
in various markets, they appeal to a wide range of 
consumers with different sets of preferences. A study by the 
European Network and Information Security Agency found 
that, when given a choice, the majority of consumers would 
prefer buying from a more privacy-invasive provider if they 
charged a lower price.184 Against this backdrop, we argue 
that the challenge lies not in the direct interaction between 
the social credit providers and loan seekers because this 




182 See Press Release, Progressive, Safer Drivers Pay Less for Car 
Insurance with Snapshot Pay As You Drive Insurance Program from 
Progressive (May 20, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/safer-
drivers-pay-less-for-car-insurance-with-snapshot-pay-as-you-drive-insur 
ance-program-from-progressive-2015-05-20 [http://perma.cc/7LP5-5ASV]. 
183 Peppet, supra note 17, at 1157 (“Even with control over her 
personal information, he argued, an individual will often find it in her self-
interest to disclose such information to others for economic gain. If she can 
credibly signal to a health insurer that she does not smoke, she will pay 
lower premiums.”). 
184 NICOLA JENTZSCH ET AL., EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, 
STUDY ON MONETISING PRIVACY: AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR PRICING 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 1 (2012), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/ 
identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/monetising-privacy [http://perma.cc/ 
V3LJ-3424]. 
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B. Derivative Privacy Effect 
Instead, we find the troubling privacy challenge 
transpires at the derivative level: those facing the greatest 
privacy risk in the wake of social credit systems are third 
parties, whose presence is intertwined with the loan seeker’s 
actions. By “third parties” we refer to the loan seeker’s 
contacts, followers, and friends, whose interaction with the 
loan seeker, whether of a one-time or reoccurring nature, are 
analyzed and factored into a calculation of financial risk. 
Third parties’ privacy harm depends on the amount and type 
of information collected and evaluated by the specific credit-
generating algorithm, and generally correlates with the 
degree of disclosure and invasiveness authorized by the loan 
seeker. On the worse end of the spectrum are lenders that 
require unlimited access to an applicant’s social network 
accounts. By granting such access, the loan seeker in fact 
delegates the privilege to access and view information about 
her contacts to the lender, without notifying or obtaining 
approval for such delegation. Subsequently, the lender can 
view posts and photos from third parties, learning about 
some remarkably private aspects of their lives. 
On the better end of the privacy-invading spectrum are 
lenders that look at publicly available information without 
bypassing privacy firewalls. Third parties are still unaware 
of the use, but there is seemingly less discomfort with use of 
publicly available details. Just like in the offline world, goes 
the claim, one must assume responsibility for the 
information one unveils to the world. Leaving one’s social 
footprints traceable and available online comes at the cost of 
it being used for various purposes without consent. Indeed, 
the argument in favor of using publicly accessible 
information about third parties for financial ranking is 
powerful, but four considerations significantly mitigate these 
rationalizations. First, even though the initial inquiry is 
directly fixated on the loan seeker, information collected 
could potentially be retained and cross-referenced to make 
future creditworthiness determinations related to one of the 
indirectly-involved third parties. Second, unlike widely used 
big data analytics that generally lack personal components, 
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personal identification is inherent to the process of social-
based scoring, making the prospects of a privacy harm 
greater to third parties. Third, advanced algorithmic 
modeling and big data can yield inferences about private 
information that may have never been disclosed to the online 
platform, leaving individuals exposed in ways they could not 
have anticipated.185 Finally, as the subsequent discussion 
below illustrates, whether a particular use agrees with 
existing privacy norms should not be squarely contingent on 
the public/private dichotomy. Instead, subject to a 
reasonableness check, the expectations of an individual 
whose privacy interest may be harmed should be used as the 
barometer of privacy violation claims. 
1. Contextual Integrity Theory of Privacy 
Two benchmark theories of privacy shed light on the 
legitimacy of the practice of collection and use of information 
about third parties. Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity 
theory offers a conceptual framework that marries the 
protection of private information and the norms of 
information flow within particular contexts.186 Designed to 
detect whether the introduction of a new practice or 
technology into a given social context breaches governing 
informational norms, the contextual integrity theory rejects 
the traditional distinction of public versus private 
information. Instead, the theory suggests that information-
sharing activities present themselves in a “plurality of 
distinct realms,” all of which are governed by norms of 
information flow that define the contours of our essential 
entitlements regarding personal information.187 The theory 
distinguishes between two classes of informational norm: 
 
185 For example, researchers were able to fairly accurately guess the 
characteristics of a group of Facebook users by analyzing their “likes.” See 
Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and Google: 
Emergent Challenges of Computational Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 203, 
210 (2015). 
186 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 23. 
187 Id. at 137. 
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norms of appropriateness and norms of flow or 
distribution.188 Norms of appropriateness determine whether 
information of a certain type or nature is appropriate for 
disclosure in a given context.189 In addition to the question of 
appropriateness in a given context, contextual integrity also 
considers whether the distribution or flow of the information 
conforms to contextual norms of information flow.190 
Accordingly, privacy is invaded when these informational 
norms are violated. 
In the direct privacy harm context, from a loan seeker’s 
perspective, both informational norms are preserved. The 
loan seeker chooses to disclose personal information about 
herself for an economic reward. The user understands that 
the information shared will be used to evaluate her financial 
well being and may or may not result in a loan with 
preferred terms. Neither norms of appropriateness nor 
norms of flow are contravened. Though information flow has 
undoubtedly changed since the loan seeker first signed up to 
the social network or otherwise made her online footprints 
visible, when a user opts to use a lending service that takes 
account of her online social image, she actively and willfully 
changes the information flow for what she believes to be her 
advantage. 
In the derivative privacy harm context, the same 
argument does not stand when the subject of the data 
analysis is a third party. The third party has control over the 
first point of sharing in the social network: she signed up to 
the network to interact with friends, family, co-workers, and 
people of various levels of proximity under a certain degree 
of exposure and privacy expectations. However, when 
disclosing information in the course of online socialization, 
third parties rarely contemplate the possibility of being 
evaluated to financially rank others. Furthermore, while it is 
unclear from the description of current lending practices, we 
 
188 See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. 
L. REV. 119, 138 (2004). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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assume the information collected and the financial grade of 
third parties is kept and could be used for future reference if 
the third party decides to apply for a loan via a social credit 
system. 
Thus, norms of appropriateness are transgressed when 
lenders collect and use information shared in the interest of 
online socialization for financial ranking purposes of others 
and, possibly, of third parties as well. Norms of information 
flow are also breached as third parties are generally 
unaware and have not expected such use of social 
information at the specific point of the data chain where the 
risk analysis takes place. To put it differently, third parties’ 
right to privacy is violated due to the unexpected flow of 
personal information from entities that they reasonably 
expect to collect and use social information (e.g., social 
networks) to other entities (e.g., marketplace lenders) that 
use the same information to gauge financial risk. 
The contextual integrity theory is directly dependent on 
individual and societal privacy expectations, and those are 
highly susceptible to changes over time. Thus, if social credit 
systems become widespread, many of the arguments listed 
above would lose much of their strength because the use of 
social information for financial ranking purposes would no 
longer be utterly outside the purview of an individual’s 
expectations. The more people turn to those alternative 
lenders, the more people will be familiar with social credit 
services. Consequently, with online socialization frequently 
factored into financial risk determinations, an argument that 
condemns such practice based on unexpected information 
flow would be unpersuasive at best. 
2. Social Network Theory of Privacy 
Another guiding theory, which rests on similar 
fundamental assumptions, is Lior J. Strahilevitz’s social 
network theory of privacy.191 It, too, looks closely at 
 
191 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). Importantly, notwithstanding the clear reference 
to what we today call “social networks,” this theory is based on ongoing 
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reasonable privacy expectations given the context of the 
initial disclosure by applying predictive social analytics and 
advocating that courts use the same analytics. Specifically, 
Strahilevitz argues that the nature of the information shared 
as well as the subject of disclosure can determine to what 
extent the information is likely to be disseminated outside of 
the original group of recipients and accordingly to what 
extent such dissemination could reasonably give rise to 
privacy violation claims.192 He lists predictive factors to help 
courts establish whether, when the information was initially 
shared, it was likely to have been further disseminated 
regardless of any subsequent disclosure.193 For example, the 
more interesting, surprising, novel, revealing, or 
entertaining a particular piece of information is, the more an 
individual should reasonably expect it will be disseminated 
through a network.194 Conversely, it is fairly difficult to 
effectively aggregate and analyze complex information 
through weak ties, thus these kinds of details are likely to 
stay confidential.195 When highly connected individuals, 
which Strahilevitz refers to as “supernodes,” disclose 
information, the number of people exposed to the 
information increases and so does the likelihood that the 
information crosses networks and reaches individuals 
beyond the initial group.196 
Under the social network theory of privacy, the use of 
social information for financial ranking purposes cannot 
ground a valid privacy violation claim from a loan seeker’s 
perspective. The loan seeker, in this respect, acts as a 
supernode—disseminating and authorizing the use of 
personal information about her in return for an economic 
reward. Third parties, however, who are not directly 
involved in the transaction and are generally unaware of the 
 
research in social network theory and does not specifically analyze online 
social media. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 970–71. 
194 Id. at 972. 
195 Id. at 971. 
196 Id. at 975. 
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use, would have a valid breach of privacy claim under the 
theory. Much like the contextual integrity argument, the 
analysis here revolves around users’ expectations: when 
signing up to a social network or otherwise socially 
interacting online, one could rarely anticipate information 
about her online social whereabouts to go rampant. She 
could certainly rarely anticipate this information to be used 
to financially rank others and, potentially, even herself. If 
the lender conducts information mining using the loan 
seeker’s login passcode, a third party privacy violation claim 
is further reinforced. 
Naturally, an application of the social network theory of 
privacy to social credit systems depends on the specific 
circumstances. It requires an in-depth examination of the 
social credit system used, its users, how popular it is and 
among which populations, the algorithm employed, the 
weight given to social factors in the overall calculation, and 
more. One interesting point to note, however, is that initially 
social credit systems targeted young individuals, who 
perhaps lacked financial history but exhibited impressive 
social credentials, such as a significant communal or political 
pursuit, a large number of friends, high frequency 
exchanges, and deep online social interactions. Those 
individuals fit neatly within the description of the supernode 
category, which consists of individuals who “tend to be 
happier and better informed than the peripherals . . . more 
likely to be perceived as ‘leaders’ and . . . more likely to earn 
promotions within a workplace.”197 While this does not 
necessarily mean that supernodes assign lower value to their 
own or to someone else’s privacy interest, it is a noteworthy 
coincidence that the same group that acts as a driving force 
in an illegitimate dissemination of private information under 
the social network theory of privacy is also the same group 
targeted by social credit lending services.198 
 
197 Id. at 957. 
198 This coincidence also further supports the unraveling effect 
discussed supra in Part II.B.1. Those who choose to use social credit 
lending services are willing to disclose personal information about 
themselves, putting others that refuse to disclose in an inferior bargaining 
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V. SOCIAL POLARIZATION 
A. Online and Offline Social Segregation 
Many consumer advocates criticize algorithmic profiling 
and personalization, such as those produced by social credit 
systems, for endangering open society and democratic 
speech.199 By cataloging people into pre-determined 
categories, such systems divide society into echo chambers of 
like-minded peers.200 Building on this observation, we argue 
that social credit systems pose greater risks for advancing 
social polarization.201 As explained above, systematic 
consideration of social information motivates individuals to 
polish their online image for a better creditworthiness grade. 
The more desirable the end product, the more individuals, 
such as Type B, would tend to act to improve their chances of 
getting the best deal. Following this logic, rational users 
aware of potential financial harm from certain online 
interactions may seek to remove hazardous links while 
strengthening beneficial social ties. They may sanitize their 
list of friends by unfriending those who went bankrupt, lost 
their jobs, live in a poor neighborhood, or are otherwise 
 
position. Supernodes also provide backdoor access to this same 
information that third parties prefer to keep veiled, because “social” 
ranking inherently involves an information tie that keep all the contacts 
in an online social circle linked together. The system offers a clear 
incentive for supernodes to act as access facilitators: “Supernodes 
maintain their privileged status by continuing to serve as information 
clearinghouses, and, in certain contexts, become supernodes based in part 
on their willingness to share previously private information about 
themselves.” Id. 
199 See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS 
HIDING FROM YOU (2011); JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW 
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 
(2011); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 252 
(2013). 
200 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 199. 
201 For the possibility of network fragmentation and its effect on the 
accuracy of social credit systems see Wei et al., supra note 117. 
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perceived as financially risky, and by permitting their social 
network friends to include only those with good careers and 
financial standing. Rational individuals would apply the 
same cleansing process to followers—those who are not 
“friends” but with whom the rational social networker 
interacts with by consuming and commenting on content 
they post. Friends and accounts followed by a social 
networker also include service providers, celebrities, radical 
public figures, media bodies, governmental agencies, and 
more. In other words, one’s online social image merges social 
interactions with intellectual (and non-intellectual) interests, 
shopping preferences, news consumption, and more. 
From a rational user’s perspective, an online social 
cleanup makes perfect economic sense. Artificial acts of 
online social restructure, however, have ramifications 
beyond the individual user. Such changes may lead to online 
social polarization, where users are regrouped by the level of 
financial risk they embody to their contact. Those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds would interact only with users 
who, likewise, have not been able to break free of the cycle of 
poverty; Ivy League alumni would only allow themselves to 
be associated with similarly elite peers;202 an executive 
wishing to virtually follow an organization committed to 
helping poor families is likely to avoid creating a traceable 
connection between herself and the unfortunate, and for 
similar reasons may be reluctant to “like” the business page 
for her best friend’s debt refinancing company. 
Indeed, individuals tend to form online relationships with 
individuals who share similar backgrounds, characteristics, 
interests, and locations.203 As people generally interact 
primarily with their peers offline, social networks further 
facilitate homophily.204 While early research on online 
 
202 Kadhim Shubber, SoFi really wants you to think it isn’t a bank, 
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 3015), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/12/03/2146561/so 
fi-really-wants-you-to-think-it-isnt-a-bank/ [http://perma.cc/BB63-RK3G]. 
203 M. McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social 
Networks. 27 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 415, 416 (2001). 
204 Homophily is the idea that “a contact between similar people 
occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people.” Id. at 416. 
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communities assumed that online social networkers would 
connect with others outside their offline social group—for 
example, forming communities around shared interests as 
opposed to shared geography—later studies suggested that 
people used online social networks to maintain preexisting 
offline affairs or otherwise solidify offline connections, as 
opposed to meet new people.205  
The natural inclination to interact within a homogenous 
group, however, does not suggest that existing social circles 
necessarily reflect a strict allocation by financial risk. 
Furthermore, individuals online connect on various grounds 
that could bring together people from entirely different 
economic classes. Even the latest studies acknowledge that 
in addition to their role as offline relationship boosters, 
online social networks enable the launch of new social ties, 
even with complete strangers.206 Similar interests, like a 
shared taste in music or a favorite online game, often give 
rise to such online social interfacing.207 Furthermore, 
individuals use social networks as an information conduit 
beyond the social context (e.g., consuming news), as a way to 
learn about and communicate with businesses (e.g., following 
Macy’s on Instagram), and to form connections around 
similar interests (e.g., using the networking platform 
MeetUp, which allows users to connect online and then 
“meet up” offline). Those common uses, that are not social in 
the traditional sense, group social networks’ users in 
interest-based categories with no clear financial standing 
match. Social networks also allow people to maintain 
connections as they move from one offline community to 
 
205 Ellison et al., supra note 24, at 1144. 
206 Id. at 1143; see also Daria J. Kuss & Mark D. Griffiths, Online 
Social Networking and Addiction—A Review of the Psychological 
Literature, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 3528, 3531 (2011). 
207 Sabine Trepte et al., The Social Side of Gaming: How Playing 
Online Computer Games Creates Online and Offline Social Support, 28 
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 832, 832 (2012) (“The results complement 
existing research by showing that online gaming may result in strong 
social ties, if gamers engage in online activities that continue beyond the 
game and extend these with offline activities.”). 
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another, going through career and life changes. Thus, social 
networks preserve connections initiated in an earlier point of 
life, even if the number of similarity points has decreased 
dramatically over time.208 
The consequences of rational users’ perfecting their 
profiles in response to social-based financial ranking are 
likely to go beyond virtual realms. Studies have found a 
strong link between online and offline socialization, both in 
terms of causality—offline connections result in online 
connections and vice versa—and in terms of maintenance. 
Offline social networks are supported and reinforced via 
online social networks.209 That is, rather than operating as 
separate domains for social action, online social networks 
merge online and offline behavior and should be viewed as 
an integrated set of communication practices.210  
Accordingly, if a practice of filtering one’s online friends 
list based on financial health and possible risk indicators 
becomes commonplace, it would have real life consequences. 
Because our tangible world is heavily supported by its 
virtual counterpart, online social polarization means that 
offline connections with no online equivalence are costlier. 
Support from online social networks allows individuals to 
more efficiently bolster their offline social ties. Judging by 
 
208 Ellison et al., supra note 24, at 1165. 
209 See, e.g., id. at 1144 (finding that individuals tend to use the 
online space for supporting mostly offline relationships but also to form 
new connections); Kaveri Subrahmanyam et al., Online and offline social 
networks: Use of social networking sites by emerging adults, 29 J. APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 420, 427–28 (2008); Sandra Zwier et al., 
Boundaries to the Articulation of Possible Selves Through Social 
Networking Sites: The Case of Facebook Profilers’ Social Connectedness, 14 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 571, 575 (2011). 
210 See, e.g., Nicole Ellison et al., With a Little Help from My Friends: 
Social Network Sites and Social Capital, in A NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, 
COMMUNITY AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 
2011); Charles Steinfield et al., Online Social Networks Sites and the 
Concept of Social Capital, in FRONTIERS IN NEW MEDIA RESEARCH 115 
(Francis L. F. Lee et al. eds., 2012); Ellison et al., supra note 24, at 1150; 
Adalbert Mayer & Steven L. Puller, The old boy (and girl) network: Social 
network formation on university campuses, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 329, 346 
(2008). 
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the number of active users, this choice is enthusiastically 
opted for and widely used.211 While users could maintain 
offline relationships with no online trace, such maintenance 
would be harder. Most individuals would be left with only 
strong bonds that are oftentimes supported by geographical 
proximity. Without Facebook, keeping in touch with one’s 
high school friends across the ocean could seem less 
attractive and unworthy of one’s time. Widespread online 
segregation caused by social financial ranking could also 
legitimize the idea that people should be valued by their 
economic standing, and that friendships should accordingly 
occur only among homogenous groups. Once validated online, 
such a view may be easily exported offline, bringing a 
second-generation separate-but-equal regime into being. 
B. Social Harms: Decrease in Social Capital and Lower 
Social Mobility 
The potential score-based segregation online and offline 
could have a number of adverse consequences. First, 
intentional changes to one’s online social circles curtail the 
resources accumulated through relationships among people, 
broadly conceptualized as social capital.212 Social capital 
empowers individuals to draw on the resources of other 
members of their networks, such as useful information, 
personal relationships, or the capacity to organize groups.213 
Studies have established a clear link between communities 
 
211 As of the second quarter of 2015, Facebook had 1.49 billion 
monthly active users. See Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users 
Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 2015 (in Millions), STATISTA, http:// 
www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-
users-worldwide/ [http://perma.cc/T6MP-HY8R]. 
212 See BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 25, at 119 (expanding the 
concept of “capital,” which was traditionally related only to economics, to 
include social, cultural, and symbolic resources, and defining social capital 
as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual 
or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”). 
213 See Pamela Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in the United 
States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment, 105 AM. J. SOC. 88, 92 (1999). 
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possessing greater social capital and a variety of positive 
social outcomes, including better public health, lower crime 
rates, and more efficient financial markets.214 Various forms 
of social capital were also found to positively affect 
psychological well-being, self-esteem, and satisfaction with 
life.215 Conversely, declining social capital may lead to 
increased social disorder, reduced participation in civic 
activities, and potentially more distrust among community 
members.216 There is a robust connection between online 
social network usage and the accumulation of two forms of 
social capital: the bridging type, which involves exposure to 
information and resources from weak ties like coworkers, 
classmates, and acquaintances, and the bonding type, which 
encompasses connections to stronger ties such as family and 
close friends.217 
Against this backdrop, changes to an individual’s online 
social circles that reduce the variety and number of ties she 
may form and maintain are expected to drive decreased 
social capital. Financially risky contacts, which may be 
unattractive to maintain from an economic viewpoint, could 
potentially offer access to non-redundant information and 
accelerate one’s social capital just as much as financially 
ideal contacts would. Furthermore, access to a variety of 
financial resources, which has been growing since the 
introduction of online social networks and which the rise of 
social credit now threatens, has economic value in and of 
itself. This value consists in allowing individuals to convert 
social capital into economic capital.218 This economic capital 
may be greater than the financial benefit one could enjoy by 
 
214 See Paul S. Adler & Seok-Woo Kwon, Social capital: Prospects for a 
new concept, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 17, 29–30 (2002). 
215 See John A. Bargh and Katelyn Y. A. McKenna, The Internet and 
social life, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573 (2004). 
216 See Ellison et al., supra note 24, at 1145. 
217 See Steinfield et al., supra note 210, at 120–22. 
218 A similar argument was made in the context of traditional (offline) 
social networks by Pierre Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of 
Capital, in SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 69, 103 (Mark Granovetter & 
Richard Swedberg eds., 2001). 
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maintaining a strictly elite social circle.219 However, unlike 
the clear and defined value of financial benefits an 
individual could gain by pertaining to a strictly elite social 
circle, the value of economic capital that originates in social 
capital is hard to quantify, making it virtually impossible to 
determine which benefit is greater. Individuals are thus 
expected to follow the clearer path, fine-tune their online 
persona, and as a result reduce their social capital. 
Because social capital correlates with social mobility, a 
decrease in the former leads to a decrease in the latter. 
Social mobility quantifies the movements of specific entities 
through the distribution of economic well-being over time,220 
namely, the connection between the relative economic status 
of an agent and her starting conditions, such as parental 
income or family background. A recent study has shown that 
in the United States roughly half of parental income benefits 
are rolled over to the next generation in the form of higher 
earnings and that a significant share of the inequality 
between families at the tenth and ninetieth income 
percentiles persists into the next generation.221 Social capital 
and the way people capitalize on social relations to move 
across social strata explain these different mobility 
chances.222 Specifically, social capital of the “bridging” type 
 
219 Similarly, note that “it is unclear how large the increased online 
socioeconomic segregation would be and whether the social cost will be low 
relative to the credit benefits.” Wei et al., supra note 117. 
220 See e.g., Jere R. Behrman, Social Mobility: Concepts and 
Measurement, in NEW MARKETS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES? ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 69, 70 (Nancy Birdsall & Carol 
Graham eds., 2000); Gary S. Fields, Income Mobility: Concepts and 
Measures, in NEW MARKETS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES? ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
MOBILITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 101 (Nancy Birdsall & Carol Graham eds., 
2000). 
221 See MITNIK ET AL., supra note 26, at 70–72. 
222 See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Social Capital and Segregation: Race, 
Connections, and Inequality in America 34 (Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, 
Harvard Univ. Working Paper No. RWP02-011, 2003); see also Silvia 
Domínguez & Celeste Watkins, Creating Networks for Survival and 
Mobility: Social Capital Among African-American and Latin-American 
Low-Income Mothers, 50 SOC. PROBS. 1 (2003). 
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secures social leverage and helps individuals change their 
opportunity structure and socioeconomic mobility.223 The size 
and essence of the network receive special emphasis, because 
pre-digital age studies have established that great, 
dispersed, and heterogeneous social networks amplify 
prospects for advancement.224 As social segregation could 
detrimentally affect social capital, an already slow and 
unsatisfactory rate of socioeconomic mobility would be 
further stymied. 
C. A “Duty” to be Forgotten 
Social financial ranking and the ensuing social 
polarization would also force people to choose between their 
social ties from the past and a better financial score in the 
future. A traceable connection to a poor community, bad 
neighborhood, or detrimental financial record could put a 
person’s good score at risk. It does not matter, for ranking 
purposes, if the person belonged to that poor community in 
the past, used to live in or in proximity to the bad 
neighborhood, or knows that bankrupt from elementary 
school. The connection would be considered harmful from an 
economic perspective. Thus, the rational move would be for 
individuals to detach themselves from their financially 
destructive past.  
The desire to disconnect oneself from an unsavory past is 
at the heart of a highly debated fair information principle: 
the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten affords 
individuals the right that at some point data about their 
personal life will be deleted, rather than exist in databases 
 
223 See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: 
Housing Mobility and the Many Faces of Social Capital, 9 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 177 (1998). 
224 See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: 
Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987); Barry 
Wellman & Milena Gulia, The Network Basis of Social Support: A Network 
is More than the Sum of its Ties, in NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: 
LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITIES 83, 107–08 (Barry Wellman ed., 
1999). 
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indefinitely.225 The right to be forgotten could hypothetically 
mean the right to have information deleted after a preset 
period, the right to have a clean slate, and the right to be 
connected to current information and delinked from outdated 
information.226 The revisability principle, another component 
of a hypothetical right to be forgotten, allows individuals the 
ability to revise their identity to some significant extent. 
Revisability would permit individuals to update their 
socially-expressed beliefs and identities and edit views from 
the distant past.227 
The eternal record of one’s online past stands in sharp 
contradiction to the rationale behind the right to be forgotten 
and the revisability principle. It is also at odds with current 
credit law, as the FCRA sets limitations on the time that 
negative information can be reported, practically deeming 
such information “forgotten”: credit reporting agencies are 
prohibited from reporting negative information older than 
seven years, except for certain information that can be 
reported for ten years such as bankruptcies and student 
loans.228 
 
225 The Court of Justice of the European Union embraced the right to 
be forgotten in its May 2014 ruling in Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014). 
226 See Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the 
Right to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 349, 367 (2015). 
227 See Andrew Tutt, The Revisability Principle, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
1113, 1116 (2015). 
228 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2012). A similar rationality guides scholarly 
proposals to allow individuals to part ways with information about them 
that is no longer relevant and that under existing legal standards they 
could “delete” or otherwise conceal as a means of providing a second 
chance. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT (Yale University Press, 2008), 227; Jonathan Zittrain, 
Reputational Bankruptcy, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It 
(Sept. 7, 2010), http://futureoftheinternet.org/2010/09/07/reputation-
bankruptcy/ [http://perma.cc/N5UD-3BEQ]; VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, 
DELETE: THE VIRTUES OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2009); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. 
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Interestingly, while the right to be forgotten, the 
revisability principle, and the FCRA terms all relate to the 
notion of decoupling the present from the past, none address 
the challenges raised by the rise of social credit. Because it is 
the social networks’ users that determine the substance of 
their accounts, they could simply delete information they 
prefer would be forgotten and reconstitute their past social 
image by making the changes they see fit. Thus, social credit 
does not implicate any need to resort to the FCRA, the right 
to be forgotten, or the revisability principle. It does, however, 
turn those voluntary rights into virtual obligations. Faced 
with a difficult choice between her social history and her 
social credit score, a person would not simply have a right to 
disconnect from her past, but a perceivably rational duty to 
erase her damaging societal record. 
VI. ON ALGORITHMS, DISCRIMINATION, AND 
INTEGRITY229 
In his book, The Black Box Society, Frank Pasquale notes 
that credit bureaus pioneered “black box techniques,” 
generating decisions of crucial importance for people, yet 
hiding their methods for data collection and analysis.230 
Indeed, the credit scoring process is an enigma not only to 
the common consumer, but even to the most sophisticated 
and cautious borrower.231 Because of the opacity around 
credit scoring systems, those systems fail in directing the 
scored individuals to the optimal credit behavior. Consumers 
cannot clearly identify acts that would strengthen their 
 
U. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Frank Pasquale, Ranking, Reductionism, and 
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 56 (2006). 
229 An additional challenge that could be grouped with this class of 
risks relates to cybersecurity. The massive volume of personal data that is 
mined, analyzed and stored by private corporations increases the risks of 
data security breaches for consumers. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 51 (May 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_repor
t_may_1_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/B523-FLBU]. 
230 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 22 (2015). 
231 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 10. 
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measured creditworthiness as well as acts that could 
potentially lower their score.232 Even if consumers pay to 
learn about their credit score by purchasing scores from 
consumer reporting agencies, they have no way of knowing 
ahead of time whether the scores they obtain will adhere 
closely to, or differ moderately or considerably from, a score 
sold to creditors.233 In addition to invoking fairness concerns, 
such information asymmetry hinders consumers’ ability to 
determine if they can obtain credit at a fair price.234 Under 
the veil of secrecy and their complex structure, existing 
scoring models also puzzle regulators, who frequently cannot 
fully understand, challenge, or audit them.235 
Credit scoring systems arguably generate arbitrary 
results. A 2012 study by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau found that one out of five consumers is expected to 
have a score that is “meaningfully” different from the score a 
lender would use to make a credit decision.236 Amidst a long-
lasting state of opacity, those deviations indicate a 
significant share of arbitrary valuations.237 Due to their 
arbitrary nature, existing credit scoring systems ended up 
penalizing consumers for responsible behavior,238 facilitating 
de facto discriminatory lending practices,239 and having the 
 
232 See id. at 11. 
233 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN CONSUMER- AND CREDITOR-PURCHASED CREDIT SCORES (Sept. 
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201209_Analysis_Differences_Con 
sumer_Credit.pdf/ [http://perma.cc/J9WP-TD46]. 
234 See Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An 
Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex 
Financial Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 
118 (2011). 
235 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 11. 
236 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 233, at 7 (analyzing 
200,000 credit files from the three major credit bureaus, TransUnion, 
Equifax, and Experian). 
237 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 12. 
238 Id. 
239 See Cassandra Jones Havard, “On The Take”: The Black Box of 
Credit Scoring and Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 241, 
245 (2011). 
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potential for worldwide calamitous results. This potential 
materialized in the financial crisis of 2008.240 
Credit scoring practices also perpetuate structural racism 
and negative biases about minority groups by systemizing 
existing discriminations. Evidence suggests that, because 
there are common factors among minority groups that reflect 
higher rates of denial or approval for credit, credit scoring 
has a disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged 
classes.241 For example, a 2014 study examining minority 
access to housing found that minorities were much more 
likely to have their mortgage applications denied.242 Hoping 
to minimize disparate impact on minorities, many states 
today regulate the use of credit scores in insurance 
underwriting. 
Algorithmic models that utilize big data mining and 
insights magnify opacity, arbitrariness, and disparate impact 
on minorities endemic to credit scoring systems. What are 
commonly referred to as “black box systems” implicate four 
main problems: (i) the data used may be inaccurate or 
inappropriate, (ii) algorithmic modeling may be biased or 
limited, (iii) machine learning may increasingly replace 
much of the control humans had on algorithmic decision-
making, and (iv) the uses of algorithms are oftentimes 
opaque. 
Originating in Internet sources, errors, outages, and 
losses in large data sets are amplified when multiple data 
sets are combined.243 The choice of data to be mined and 
analyzed is also a source of concern because data mining can 
immortalize the preconceptions of former decision-makers or 
 
240 See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 234, at 95. 
241 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 13–16. 
242 See Skylar Olson, A House Divided—How Race Colors the Path to 
Homeownership, Zillow and the National Urban League, ZILLOW (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://www.zillow.com/research/minority-mortgage-access-6127/ 
[http://perma.cc/3L6Q-ZSPT]. 
243 See Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: 
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 668 (2012). 
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mirror the widespread biases that persist in society.244 This 
is especially true for collection of social information: many 
individuals live full lives outside the social networking 
realm, and even those who perform online/offline social 
dualism do not exhibit equal qualitative and quantitative 
practices of information sharing.245 Data sets can also be 
manipulated or limited,246 and due to their magnitude they 
also run the risk of finding bogus correlations in which the 
statistical significance belies the lack of a meaningful 
connection between the variables.247 
The ground for errors and bias continues from the data 
collection phase to the design of the algorithm. Indeed, in 
theory and practice, big data digitally transforms cultural 
clichés and stereotypes into empirically certifiable data 
sets.248 Some discriminatory measures are obvious. Zip codes, 
for example, are notoriously known to signal race, but others 
are more nuanced and can be effectively disguised behind 
numerous masks and proxies.249  
Recent studies also found that the choice between mobile 
and web browsing could also indicate racial identity as 
African-Americans and Latinos were far more likely to 
 
244 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899 [http://perma.cc/J6NJ-VGLZ]. 
245 See Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification's Big Data (r)evolution, 21 
CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 355 (2015); see also Boyd & Crawford, supra note 243, 
at 669 (“Twitter does not represent ‘all people’, and it is an error to assume 
‘people’ and ‘Twitter users’ are synonymous: they are a very particular 
sub-set. Neither is the population using Twitter representative of the 
global population. Nor can we assume that accounts and users are 
equivalent.”). 
246 See Swedloff, supra note 245; Boyd & Crawford, supra note 243. 
247 See Boyd & Crawford, supra note 243; see also Gary Marcus & 
Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems With Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/eight-no-nine-prob 
lems-with-big-data.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/QLJ9-JN7U]. 
248 Michael Schrage, Big Data’s Dangerous New Era of 
Discrimination, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 29, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/01/ 
big-datas-dangerous-new-era-of-discrimination/ [http://perma.cc/HD2F-
L4VX]. 
249 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 199, at 985. 
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access bank accounts using a mobile phone.250 But even if the 
initial design lacks discriminatory intent, the interpretation 
of the data, which lies at the heart of this technology, is 
susceptible to limitation and bias.251 Indeed, algorithms are 
prone to the same bias their human originators suffer from: 
Credit scores are only as free from bias as the 
software and data behind them. Software engineers 
construct the datasets mined by scoring systems; 
they define the parameters of data-mining analyses; 
they create the clusters, links, and decision trees 
applied; they generate the predictive models applied. 
The biases and values of system developers and 
software programmers are embedded into each and 
every step of development.252 
Even if we assume that both the mined data and the 
algorithms are as neutral as possible, the latter is designed 
to find trends in the data and learn so it can improve in 
performance over time (also known as “unsupervised 
machine learning”).253 The learning algorithm is devised to 
identify general statistical patterns in the data that are not 
specifically related to some state or outcome, inferring 
absent attributes from those that are present.254 Variables 
like race and gender are commonly concealed in the observed 
attributes because they are typically explicitly or implicitly 
encoded in rich data sets. Still, the learning algorithm is 
 
250 Alloway, supra note 9. 
251 Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Six Provocations for Big Data, A 
DECADE IN INTERNET TIME: SYMPOSIUM ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNET 
AND SOCIETY (Sept. 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926431 or http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1926431 [http://perma.cc/UGN3-SMXB]. 
252 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 13–14. 
253 See PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012); see also COMMITTEE ON 
THE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE DATA ET AL., FRONTIERS IN MASSIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS 66–69 (2013), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18374/frontiers-in-
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likely to discover those factors and lead to less advantageous 
decisions for members of minority groups.255 
Advanced algorithmic modeling and big data can also 
yield inferences about private information that may have 
never been disclosed to the online platform.256 The overreach 
of data analytics is often exemplified by the ability to infer a 
fairly reliable “profile” based exclusively on Facebook “likes.” 
Researchers were able to predict with accuracy range of 
eighty to ninety percent traits such as sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religious and political views, intelligence, 
happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, 
age, and gender.257 Inferences of this sort go far beyond basic 
demographics and open the door to additional analytics and 
ranking factors that are rooted in personal traits and state of 
mind.258 If the underlying data is, as most cases show, a 
product of biased mining or analytics, the resulting 
discriminatory harm is even greater.259 
Data mining and algorithmic predictions are also 
commonly criticized for their opacity. Even though those 
methods of automated decision-making could potentially 
harm individuals’ life opportunities in arbitrary and 
discriminatory ways, they remain secret.260 The process is 
technically opaque insofar as the code is oftentimes kept 
 
255 See Lauren Kirchner, When Big Data Becomes Bad Data, PAC. 
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Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines 
Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169 (2000); Pasquale, supra note 3; Daniel J. 
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secret and, moreover, substantively opaque because 
outsiders have no way of knowing what kind of data is 
collected, which correlations are targeted, and what 
considerations are factored into the credit profiling of 
consumers. Those layers of opacity can conceal biased, 
discriminatory, or otherwise unacceptable decisions from 
oversight until negative consequences are noticeable.261 The 
secrecy protects companies and public institutions against 
public criticism because no entity would submit itself to 
being labeled racist or sexist. There is also a sincere 
intellectual property interest because exposing algorithms to 
public review also means handing them out to competitors.262 
The non-transparent nature of algorithmic decisions harms 
due process both ex ante by empowering the unregulated 
collection and analysis of information, and ex post by 
preventing users from challenging unfavorable decisions, as 
it is impossible to review the decision-making process. 
Algorithmic opacity frustrates both oversight and 
accountability. 
Finally, critics have also argued that relegating the 
decision-making authority to algorithmic systems unleashes 
human subject research that is not limited or scrutinized by 
ethical norms.263 When the ethical Wild West of data 
analytics materializes for the purpose of targeted 
advertising, the scenario seems less frightening. But when 
the financial well being of the entire population is at stake, 
an ethics-free system accompanied by low to no 
accountability is a modern society’s nightmare. 
 
261 See Pasquale, supra note 228, at 16–18. 
262 Jeremy Kun, Beware! Big Data Is Not Free of Discrimination, 
SOCIAL SCI. SPACE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.socialsciencespace.com/ 
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263 Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who Is Reading Whom Now: 
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VII. REGULATING SOCIAL CREDIT 
Social credit systems are innovative, efficient, and 
effective tools that promote broader financial inclusion with 
fewer transaction costs. Marketplace lenders have been able 
to capitalize on the current legal vacuum surrounding 
FinTech caused by delayed regulatory response to 
technological growth. Consequently, the issue of marketplace 
lending regulation is highly controversial,264 with one side 
advocating for minimal or no intervention in order not to 
stifle the innovation necessary to effectively fill in market 
gaps, and the other side warning that if not properly 
regulated, marketplace lending can become the next 
subprime-lending crisis,265 in addition to causing irreversible 
 
264 This controversy is hardly surprising.  To some extent, different 
financial industries and phenomena in the past have resulted in similar 
debates, including, for example, the housing bubble prior to the financial 
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How Marketplace Lenders Will Save Financial Services, AM. BANKER (Aug. 
19, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/how-marketplace-
lenders-will-save-financial-services-1076174-1.html [http://perma.cc/DJP9-
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FDIC Says, AM. BANKER (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.americanbanker. 
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social harms.266 Against this backdrop, in the next sections of 
this Part we discuss and rule out regulatory frameworks that 
were found inefficient in different financial markets and 
conclude by proposing a limited right to be unnetworked. 
A. Disclosure 
There are a number of possible courses to alleviate some 
of the difficulties innovative social credit systems generate. 
One such option is mandating increased disclosure. 
Disclosure provides relevant information to consumers for 
informed decision-making, and frequently reveals estimated 
costs and effects to consumers, commitments of the relevant 
parties, existence of any conflicts of interest, and 
descriptions on relationships between parties.267 For 
example, regulators have proposed similar disclosures in the 
context of educational institution admission, hiring, 
insurance, and credit.268 Regulators must ensure that 
information aggregators and decision-makers disclose the 
online sources they scrutinize to inform their decisions. 
Similarly, decision-makers should reveal the particular 
information they discovered about the individual to the 
individual if that information grounded a decision.269 
Since the Great Depression, the federal government’s 
philosophy as to financial markets and corporations has 
generally been to push for more disclosure. Increased 
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267 ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND LABOR AND POPULATION, EFFECTIVE 
DISCLOSURES IN FINANCIAL DECISIONMAKING, (2015), https://www.dol.gov/ 
ebsa/pdf/conflictofinterestresearchpaper3.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3GQ-
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disclosure, in the government’s view, fosters a robust 
informational foundation for private decision-makers and 
advances efficiency and governance.270 The same approach 
may at first seem plausible to mitigate many of the 
difficulties associated with social credit systems. More 
transparency could spotlight the downsides of social credit 
systems for both consumers and decision-makers.  
Nevertheless, this Article takes the view that disclosure 
could not deliver the desired informational and awareness 
results for the upcoming world of social credit. In recent 
years, scholars have started questioning the disclosure 
paradigm. Following the 2008 financial crisis, some have 
argued disclosure, as a tool, may not be effective given the 
complexities created by financial innovation, modern 
markets, and institutions.271 Services and products created 
by financial innovation are much more multifaceted than in 
the past, often exceeding the capacity of the verbal, visual, 
accounting, risk measurement, and other capacities on which 
 
270 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure 
Information,’ and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 
(2012). 
271 See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the 
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sophisticated investors and government agencies still do not know enough 
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14; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that 
mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve its stated goal but also leads 
to unintended consequences that often harm the very people it intends to 
serve); Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer 
Protection Law or How The Truth in Lending Act Failed The Subprime 
Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 (2010) (suggesting a switch from the 
current TILA disclosure regime to a comprehension regime under which 
lenders would be obliged to insure that borrowers understand their loan 
terms, or that lenders should be required to determine what proportion of 
their borrowers understand their loan terms and disclose those figures 
with the goal of generating competition among lenders for better 
comprehension scores). 
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representations are based.272 Opaque algorithmic decision-
making and unsupervised machine learning design further 
exacerbates this complexity.273 Merely requiring institutions 
to reveal more information is unlikely to result in a truly 
informed environment for consumers,274 especially because 
information systems are so complex, that sometimes even 
those disclosing the information do not fully understand it 
and appreciate its implications.275 
Bounded rationality276 and cognitive biases277 similarly 
prevent decision-makers from fully understanding and 
appropriately monitoring financial markets. As boundedly 
rational constituencies, decision-makers lack the 
information, time, and incentives to perform an inclusive due 
diligence on the financial markets’ various services and 
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273 See supra Part VI. 
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Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29 (2012) (arguing that that the biggest 
financial institutions’ annually mandated contingency plans are mainly a 
disclosure requirement with limited power; accordingly, living wills should 
not be perceived as a satisfactory regulatory solution to the too-big-to-fail 
problem); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 185 (2010) (stating 
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Financial Crisis and Beyond (Mar. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
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regulation). 
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Thought 68 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 1, 1–16 (1978). 
277 See Emilios Avgouleas, Reforming Investor Protection Regulation: 
The Impact of Cognitive Biases, in ESSAYS IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION IN HONOR OF ANTHONY OGUS 143 (M. Faure & F. Stephen eds., 
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products, their terms, risk level, and the differences among 
them.278 
Additionally, while helpful in promoting transparency to 
various extents, disclosure requirements are often less 
effective than substantial regulation that alters negative 
market incentives or undesired economic incentives.279 
Reviews of existing studies also support this claim. These 
studies indicate that, while in theory disclosure can reduce 
the information asymmetries present in the financial 
services market, disclosure does not offer adequate support 
for making more informed decisions, especially if used in 
isolation.280 In areas of financial decision-making such as 
mortgages, credit cards, payday loans, and mutual funds, 
long and detailed disclosure documents have not been 
effective at helping consumers make informed choices, due to 
either limited attention or limited understanding of the 
material.281 Therefore, while mandating disclosure is a key 
component of financial markets regulation, relying on it 
alone to act as a holistic panacea would prove to be a 
mistake. This is particularly true for credit scoring markets 
founded on confidential formulas282 and that exhibit delayed 
technological understanding by regulators and public 
advocacy groups.283 
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B. Disparate Impact 
The creditor assumes that consumers are more likely to 
be creditworthy if those with whom they associate are also 
creditworthy. Statistics support this notion: wealthier 
consumers tend to have wealthier friends, who are more 
likely to have higher credit scores.284 Even where financial-
based social classification has yet to take place, rational 
consumers would soon turn it into reality. Against this 
backdrop, it is reasonable to ask whether the disparate 
impact doctrine could address the difficulties brought about 
by social credit systems. The doctrine prohibits procedures 
that favor a specific group of individuals over another, 
whether or not the discrimination is intentional.285 
Importantly, such preference is already said to exist in the 
context of determining consumers’ creditworthiness.286 
Many criticize existing credit scoring models for 
systemizing discriminatory practices. In general, regulators 
do not permit scoring models for use in loan application and 
pricing assessments that are based on characteristics 
forbidden under the ECOA, such as the applicant’s religion, 
race, sex, national origin, color, marital status, the 
applicant’s receipt of income from public assistance 
 
Consumer protection agencies have nowhere near the staff they would 
need to monitor all companies trafficking in reputational data.”). 
284 See O’Neil, supra note 266. 
285 The disparate impact concept is not a new one, and has been used 
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Court Upholds Disparate-Impact Claims in Fair Housing Act Cases, NAT’L 
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programs, or the applicant’s good faith exercise of rights 
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.287 Yet some 
argue that even legally permitted factors used in scoring 
models result in disparate impact for specific demographic 
groups.288 In the years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
scholars were already skeptical about the fairness of credit 
scoring systems, arguing that the calculations were 
“inevitably subjective and value-laden,” however 
“incontestable by the apparent simplicity of [a] single 
figure.”289 Moreover, evidence suggests that current credit 
scoring systems do have an actual negative disparate effect 
on certain disadvantaged groups.290  
Recognizing those discriminatory practices, regulators 
have attempted to better standardize the credit industry. In 
1970, Congress designed the FCRA to address concerns that 
growing databases of personal data “could be used in ways 
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Accordingly, they have argued that use of such variables results in 
disparate impact based on race, gender, or other off-limits characteristics, 
and therefore violates ECOA. See Robert B. Avery et al., Does Credit 
Scoring Produce a Disparate Impact?, 40 REAL EST. ECON. 1, 3 (2012). 
Similarly, Federal Reserve Board researchers have found that different 
demographic groups have very different credit scores, on average. For 
example, Blacks and Hispanics have lower credit scores than non-Hispanic 
whites and Asians. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT (2007), http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/3JRZ-Q7A4]. 
289 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 10; see also Donncha 
Marron, ‘Lending by Numbers’: Credit Scoring and the Constitution of Risk 
Within American Consumer Credit, 36 ECON. & SOC’Y 103, 111 (2007). 
290 See BIRNY BIRNBAUM, INSURERS’ USE OF CREDIT SCORING FOR 
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE IN OHIO: A REPORT TO THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 2 (2003) (“Based upon all the available information, it is our 
opinion that insurers’ use of insurance credit scoring for underwriting, 
rating, marketing and/or payment plan eligibility very likely has a 
disparate impact on poor and minority populations in Ohio.”). 
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that were invisible and harmful to consumers.”291 In 2003, in 
an attempt to increase transparency, the FACTA began 
requiring credit bureaus to disclose credit scores to 
individuals.292 
The disparate impact doctrine could address the concerns 
raised by social credit systems that are similar to those 
raised by traditional credit scoring systems. However, the 
disparate impact doctrine is not equipped to face the 
multiple challenges of social credit systems for several 
reasons. First, notwithstanding evidence suggesting that 
current credit scoring systems have a negative disparate 
effect on disadvantaged groups,293 the system, as a whole, 
has not been reformed, and discriminatory effects still 
exist.294 Second, it is still not clear whether a disparate 
 
291 See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote 
Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy 
Challenges in the Era of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair 3 
(Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
statements/privacy-challenges-big-data-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-
chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UXC-EPWW]. 
292 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2012). 
293 See, for example, the statement of the National Fair Housing 
Alliance, from 111th Cong. 16 (2010), supra note 286. Claims of disparate 
impact on minorities and specifically that insurers’ use of credit scores is 
discriminatory were litigated in court. Dehoyos v. Allstate, 240 F.R.D. 269, 
275 (W.D. Tex. 2007). These claims eventually resulted in a settlement 
over “deficiencies in Allstate’s credit scoring procedure which plaintiffs say 
resulted in discriminatory action against approximately five million 
African-American and Hispanic customers.” Id. The parties settled after 
the Fifth Circuit determined that federal civil rights law was not reverse 
preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s grant of insurance regulatory 
authority to states. See Dehoyos v. Allstate, 345 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 
2003). ECOA, which regulates lending practices, does not preempt state 
laws that are stricter than ECOA. 
294 This does not mean that specific aspects of specific users’ scoring 
systems were never altered or improved to reduce discrimination. Minor 
specific modifications do happen when the need to do so arises, as it did for 
example, in the Allstate litigation, which resulted concluding that as part 
of the settlement plaintiffs’ experts were permitted to critique and refine 
future scoring models. Dehoyos, 240 F.R.D. at 276. Similarly, this type of 
evidence about disparate impact also led many states to take active action 
to regulate how credit scores should be used in insurance underwriting. 
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impact argument can be used to challenge algorithmic 
decision-making. Even though experts argue that “[f]ar from 
eliminating existing discriminatory practices, credit-scoring 
algorithms instead grant them an imprimatur, systematizing 
them in hidden ways,”295 proving prohibited biases and 
systematic discriminatory treatment is proving to be 
extremely complicated. Specifically, one would need access to 
the relevant source code, programmers’ summaries and 
logs,296 and the actual algorithms protected by trade secrets 
in order to detect a prohibited human bias.297 Moreover, 
supervised machine-learning is even more immune to 
reverse engineering or scrutiny, as described above.298 
C. The Right to Be Unnetworked299 
Against the backdrop of potential privacy harms, social 
segregation, due process violations, and the de facto 
discrimination it generates, we submit that the use of social 
 
CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORING: SEPARATING FACTS FROM FALLACIES, 
NAMIC POL’Y BRIEFING 1 (2010), https://iiky.org/documents/NAMIC_ 
Policy_Briefing_on_Insurance_Scoring_Feb_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
43S8-RMMY]. 
295 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 27, at 13. 
296 See Tal Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1503, 
1518 (2013) (explaining that the programmers create the datasets mined 
by scoring systems, define the parameters for the scoring analyses, and 
create the clusters, links, and decision trees applied). 
297 See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 234 at 91 (“As property, complex 
finance risk models often receive intellectual property proprietary 
protection. These proprietary protections may take the form of patents, 
copyrights, trade secrets, and sometimes trademarks.”). 
298 See supra text accompanying notes 224–59. 
299 The right to be unnetworked is inspired by the right to be let 
alone. In their Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy, Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren identified protection of the private realm as 
the foundation for individual freedoms in the modern age and coined the 
phrase “the right to be left alone,” which stems from the right to privacy. 
Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). Later, in his famous 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 
Brandeis identified the “right to be let alone” as “the most comprehensive 
of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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information for creditworthiness determinations should be 
more limited and regulated. Inspired by the ban on the use of 
medical information for credit scoring purposes, our proposal 
aims at minimizing the use of social information to uses that 
fall into one of the prescribed exclusions.300 Therefore, the 
proposal allows individuals to benefit from social information 
under certain conditions, without being penalized for their 
social choices. The proposal grants individuals a limited 
right to be unnetworked or be networked but not socially 
scored, while redirecting creditors to the original aim of 
microfinance—broadening financial inclusion. 
The right to be unnetworked marks the first attempt to 
respond to the rise of social credit. As such, the proposal does 
not intend to provide a comprehensive answer but to present 
initial views and provoke further discussions as to how social 
credit systems should be addressed conceptually and 
regulated in practice. We hope that the right to be 
unnetworked will be further developed and that its list of 
exceptions will be refined and extended in light of the goal 
we advocate for: retaining the benefits that social credit 
systems embody while mitigating some of the challenges 
those systems generate. 
“Social Information,” for this Part, is broadly defined as 
information or data, in any form or medium, created by or 
derived from a social network or the consumer that relates to 
the past, present, or future physical, virtual, and interactive 
social ties of an individual;301 the providing of social 
activities to individual by digital platforms; or the payment 
 
300 See generally Laura Hobson Brown, Final Rule: Using Medical 
Information in Determining Creditworthiness, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
664 (2006). 
301 While social ties could be interactive, they could also be one-sided 
following or monitoring of a different person’s activities and online 
footprints. A person, for this definition, includes individuals as well as 
entities. 
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for enhanced or non-free services offered by digital platforms 
to an individual.302 
“Derivative Social Information,” for the purpose of this 
Part, is broadly defined as information or data, in any form 
or medium, created by or derived from a social network or 
the contacts of the consumer that relates to the past, 
present, or future physical, virtual, and interactive social ties 
of an individual’s contacts; the providing of social activities 
to an individual’s contacts by digital platforms; or the 
payment for enhanced or non-free services offered by digital 
platforms to an individual’s contacts. 
Information extracted from any transactions with social 
networks acting as service providers or intermediaries in 
sales and financial transactions is not defined as social 
information per se. The use of such information for the 
purpose of assessing creditworthiness and the value of such 
transactions is therefore not in violation of the broad 
exclusionary rule against obtaining or using social 
information in assessing and calculating an individual’s 
credit-worthiness. 
Possessing Social Information and Derivative Social 
Information might not necessarily be the result of a 
creditor’s deliberate planning or specific request. Hence, a 
creditor that merely obtains unsolicited social information 
about individuals from themselves, a consumer reporting 
agency, or any other person, will not be considered to be in 
violation of the broad exclusionary rule against obtaining or 
using social information in assessing and calculating an 
individual’s credit-worthiness. The creditor, however, may 
only use unsolicited Social Information in connection with 
determining an individual’s creditworthiness, if doing so is 
based on one of the limited exceptions to the broad 
exclusionary rule. Under no circumstances may a creditor 
use unsolicited Derivative Social Information independently 
of Social Information. 
 
302 A classic example would be a LinkedIn Premium account for which 
members would typically pay and register when looking for a job or 
expanded networking opportunities. 
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The exclusionary rule against obtaining or using social 
information in assessing and calculating an individual’s 
credit-worthiness is not all-inclusive and is subject to the 
following exceptions. First, a creditor can factor into credit 
assessment social information on financial guaranties, which 
are based on personal social ties that make individuals agree 
or even want to become other consumers’ guarantors.303 
Second, a creditor may obtain and use social information to 
comply with applicable requirements of state, local, or 
federal laws. Third, a creditor may obtain and use social 
information in connection with its determination of a 
consumer’s eligibility for a special credit program or a credit-
related assistance program that is: (i) designed to benefit 
“unscored” consumers with exceptional social standing that 
include individuals with thin or no credit file, such as college 
students and young adults, immigrants, widows or new 
divorcees, the elderly, ethnic minorities, and low-income 
individuals, and (ii) established and administered under a 
written plan that identifies the class of persons it is designed 
to benefit, and sets out the procedure and criteria for 
extending credit or providing other credit-related assistance 
under the program. Fourth, a creditor may obtain and use 
social information in determining a consumer’s eligibility for 
credit to the extent necessary for fraud prevention or 
detection. Creditors who wish to operate based on this 
exception might be asked to demonstrate the need for, and 
the actual use of, the social information in the detection or 
prevention of the fraud. Fifth, a creditor may use a 
consumer’s social information if the consumer requests that 
the creditor use his or her information in determining credit 
eligibility, in order to accommodate the consumer’s 
particular circumstances, provided the creditor documents 
that request. The social accommodation exception is not 
triggered until the consumer makes a formal detailed 
request for such an accommodation. Either way, the creditor 
may not deny a consumer’s application or otherwise treat the 
 
303 This is similar to the concept of power of attorney, and the use of 
medical information to determine mental or physical capacity. 
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consumer less favorably as a result of the consumer’s request 
for social accommodation, if the creditor would have treated 
the consumer more favorably under its otherwise existing 
and established criteria.304 Notwithstanding the listed 
exceptions, under no circumstances should Derivative Social 
Information be analyzed, used, or stored independently of 
Social Information. 
D. Against a Financially Sound Policy—Precedents 
As a society, we typically tend to promote methods and 
techniques that help us establish policy frameworks for 
effective and efficient financial regulation.305 The use of 
social information as a factor for determining one’s credit 
holds an accuracy promise, and thus makes financial 
sense.306 Yet both legal and business concerns may cause 
 
304 Allowing creditors to factor in social information at the consumer’s 
request creates an opt-in regime. Nevertheless, the use of the social 
information is limited to solely benefiting the consumer and cannot 
decrease her score. Limiting the scope of such an opt-in regime by making 
it a narrow and carefully tailored exceptions minimizes negative effects on 
other consumers as it does not establish a new baseline. Therefore, the 
suggested exception does not prejudice consumers choosing not to opt in as 
no negative inferences are made about them and their reasons for not 
participating. 
305 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY 
FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT FINANCIAL REGULATION (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/44362818.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/3WJQ-Y34D]. 
306 See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, Could Your Social Media Footprint Step 
On Your Credit History?, NPR (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2015/11/04/454237651/could-your-social-media-footprint-step-
on-your-credit-history [http://perma.cc/V2PN-AERN] (stating that “[t]hese 
alternative data sources have proven to accurately score more than 90% of 
applicants who otherwise would be returned as no-hit or thin-file by 
traditional models”); Tom Groenfeldt, Lenddo Creates Credit Scores Using 
Social Media, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tom 
groenfeldt/2015/01/29/lenddo-creates-credit-scores-using-social-media 
[http://perma.cc/C6XS-PDRQ] (noting that some banks are quickly 
adopting Lenddo, which in turn is “finding a lot of interest in its lending 
application from outside of banking. Telcos are interested because they 
already have a credit history with their customers, and because their 
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society to opt to disallow a financially sound policy that 
socioeconomic, cultural, and moral arguments counsel 
against. 
One such policy that is financially sound but has been 
broadly rejected is price discrimination against overweight 
individuals based on the reasonable argument they cost 
more to service. Specifically, adopting weight bias as a 
financial policy has recently appeared in the context of 
airfare pricing policy, which required overweight passengers 
pay for an additional seat307 or changed the pricing scheme 
to a “pay-per-pound” rate system, as suggested by an airline 
in Samoa.308 These new schemes have prompted discussions 
over whether American airlines should adopt comparable 
pricing systems.309 Nevertheless, similar practices, except for 
 
revenues are going down as people use mobiles more for texting and data 
and less for voice.”). 
307 See Arya M. Sharma, How “Pay As You Weigh” Shames the Obese, 
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 
arya-m-sharma-md/pay-as-you-weighh_b_3112315.html [http://perma.cc/ 
BR8N-YR23] (explaining the new pay-per-pound airline fare system); How 
Should Airlines Treat Larger Passengers?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2012/11/obese-flyers [http:// 
perma.cc/SFC6-B732] (describing Air Canada’s policy of giving a free 
additional seat to overweight passengers with a medical caregiver’s note). 
308 See Lucy Craymer, Weigh More, Pay More on Samoa Air, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323646 
604578399943583708244 [http://perma.cc/8M8Q-PG4U]; Pay Your Weight 
to Fly, FREAKONOMICS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://freakonomics.com/2013/04/10/ 
pay-your-weight-to-fly/ [http://perma.cc/VH7P-NUQD]. 
309 See, e.g., Harold Maass, Should Airlines Charge Passengers by 
Weight?, WEEK (Apr. 2, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/242156/ 
should-airlines-charge-passengers-by-weight [http://perma.cc/KT7P-BBC7] 
(highlighting that some airlines require passengers to pay second fare if 
they cannot fit comfortably in single seat). But cf. Mary Jane Credeur & 
Mary Schlangenstein, Pay-by-Weight Fares in Samoa Seen Unlikely to Be 
Copied, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
04-03/pay-by-weight-fares-in-samoa-seen-unlikely-to-be-copied.html 
[http://perma.cc/D2AE-RG45]; Mark Johanson, ‘Too Fat To Fly’: A Look At 
Airline Policies For ‘Customers Of Size,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/too-fat-fly-look-airline-policies-customers-size-
903686 [http://perma.cc/W24W-ZTPW]; Michael L. Huggins, Not “Fit” For 
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the instances mentioned, have thus far not been adopted. 
Attempts to adopt weight bias as a financial policy have also 
occurred and failed in other industries. In 2008, legislators 
in Mississippi, attempting to respond to constantly 
increasing numbers of individuals classified as overweight, 
pushed for a bill that would forbid restaurants from serving 
food to overweight individuals.310 The public instantly 
recognized the prejudicial impact of the initiative and the 
proposal never made it beyond the subcommittee level.311 
Another example of a rejected financially sound policy is 
the use of medical information as a factor for credit 
determinations. The FCRA,312 as amended by section 411 of 
 
Hire: The United States And France On Weight Discrimination In 
Employment, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 889, 900–02 (2015). 
310 See H.B. 282, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008), http://billstatus. 
ls.state.ms.us/documents/2008/pdf/HB/0200-0299/HB0282IN.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/8PED-4APU] (“Any food establishment to which this section 
applies shall not be allowed to serve food to any person who is obese . . . .”); 
Miss. Considers Restaurant Ban For Obese, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/miss-considers-restaurant-ban-for-obese/ 
[http://perma.cc/WTE4-286G] (discussing how the proposal’s drafters 
hoped to deal with obesity, which is the state’s main problem); Tom 
Leonard, Ban Restaurants from Serving Obese People, TELEGRAPH 
(London) (Feb. 3, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1577 
463/Ban-restaurants-from-serving-obese-people.html [http://perma.cc/ 
GUJ4-48Q9] (explaining that Mississippi’s population is the heaviest in 
America). 
311 See Peggy Elam, Mississippi “Obesity” Bill To Be Killed in 
Subcommittee, ON THE WHOLE BLOG (Feb. 4, 2008), http:// 
www.onthewhole.info/2008/02/mississippiobe.html [http://perma.cc/ZT4Z-
5M4Z] (stating that the Bill would be vetoed when it reached assigned 
subcommittee); OAC and Patients Bring National Attention to 
Discriminatory Mississippi House Bill 282, OBESITY ACTION CENTER, 
http://www.obesityaction.org/wp-content/uploads/Advocacy-MS.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9T6W-9YTV] (shedding light on the biased impact of the 
proposal); Obesity Bill Won’t Make it to Floor, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, 
Miss.) (Feb. 5, 2008), http://archive.clarionledger.com/article/20080205/ 
NEWS010504/802050377/Lawmaker-Obesity-bill-won-t-make-floor 
[http://perma.cc/LH2N-AQS7] (interviewing a member of the legislature 
who said the proposal would be “dead on arrival at my desk”). 
312 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012). See generally Stephen Gardner, 
Credit Reports; Basic Rights and Responsibilities of Creditors and 
Consumers, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 248 (2005). 
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the FACTA,313 impedes the capability of creditors to acquire 
and use consumers’ medical information in the context of 
determining the consumers’ credit eligibility, as well as to 
share medical information with affiliates.314 Based on the 
FACTA, the government regulatory agencies created 
exceptions to these restrictions that permit the use of 
medical information, but only in specific situations.315 These 
exceptions are unique and narrow despite the fact that 
noting if and when, for example, a consumer is terminally ill 
and factoring that information into the individual’s credit 
score makes perfect financial sense. Similarly, 
acknowledging the uniqueness of the medical context, FICO 
amended its approach to factoring in medical billing 
information in creditworthiness calculations. Despite the 
clear difference between medical billing information and 
medical information, FICO has announced in 2014 that its 
upcoming scoring model, FICO 9, will weigh medical bills in 
collections less heavily than other types of unpaid 
accounts.316 
Along similar lines, even though genetic information is 
vital in evaluating one’s health condition and prospects for 
sickness in the future, the inclusion of such information in 
coverage decisions is strictly prohibited. The 2008 Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) provides strong 
 
313 H.R. 2622, 108 Pub. L. No. 159 (Dec. 4, 2003). See Lawrence A. 
Young and Patrick McCarren, Just the FACT(s), Ma’am—A Roadmap to 
the FACT Act, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 239 (2005). 
314 See generally Laura Hobson Brown, Final Rule: Using Medical 
Information In Determining Creditworthiness, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
664 (2006). 
315 Id. 
316 See Nick Clements, 5 Reasons New Lenders Are Ignoring FICO 
Credit Scores, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nick 
clements/2015/04/21/5-reasons-new-lenders-are-ignoring-fico-credit-scores/ 
[http://perma.cc/WC6W-ZR2F] (noting that the rationale for this, as stated 
by CFPB Director Richard Cordray, is that “it’s hard for consumers to 
navigate the medical debt maze and come out with a clean credit report on 
the other side”); Bob Sullivan, The Impact of Medical Debt on FICO Scores, 
CREDIT SCORE (July 20, 2015), http://blog.credit.com/2015/07/the-impact-of-
medical-debt-on-fico-scores-121229/ [http://perma.cc/VG6B-C3UM]. 
GESLEVICH PACKIN & LEV-ARETZ – FINAL 
424 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
protections against access to genetic information and genetic 
discrimination in both the health insurance and employment 
context.317 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While technology companies have transformed the way 
we interact, they have only recently begun the unavoidable 
banking revolution, seeking to replace some of the services 
historically offered by banks. In particular, such innovative 
tech and big data companies now provide consumers and 
businesses alternative methods to access marketplace 
lending, while taking advantage of the current state and 
application of law to financial technology, as well as the gap 
between regulatory and technological growth. Regulation in 
marketplace lending has generated a debate with one side 
arguing for minimal or no regulation of this growing sector 
in order to not stifle the innovation necessary to fill market 
gaps. Simultaneously, another side is arguing that if not 
monitored and somewhat regulated, this growing industry 
can become the next subprime-lending crisis,318 and cause 
irreversible extreme social harms.319 
In this Article, we focused on social credit, which is a 
recent and unique phenomenon in marketplace lending. 
Social credit is arguably a highly efficient and accurate tool 
that can be used in various ways and formats to expand 
access to credit to populations that otherwise might be 
credit-less or underserved under the current credit system. 
While using social credit makes sense financially, using 
machine learning advanced algorithms presents certain 
unavoidable harms to society that must be carefully 
addressed. As described, our main concerns relate to privacy 
consideration and in particular, derivative privacy harms, as 
well as social polarization and potential increased damage to 
social mobility. Based on law and economic analysis, we 
 
317 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). 
318 See McCarthy, supra note 265; see also Baker, supra note 265; 
Cagney, supra note 265.  
319 See O’Neil, supra note 266. 
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show that, for different reasons, it appears inevitable that 
these types of harms would result in shocking social, 
personal, and eventually economic consequences. We believe 
that the privacy unraveling process is here to stay. We also 
believe the benefits social credit presents should not be 
easily dismissed. Therefore, we suggest an initial regulatory 
proposal for dealing with social credit in a hope to 
accommodate financial innovation, while preserving key 
rights and addressing the concerns raised. 
